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Development of computing devices with the proliferation of the Internet has prompted
enormous opportunities for cooperative computation. These computations could
occur between trusted or partially trusted partners, or even between competitors.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols allow two or more parties to col-
laborate and compute a public functionality using their private inputs without the
need for a trusted third-party. However, the generic solutions for MPC are not
adequate for some particular cases where the function itself is also sensitive and
required to be kept private. Private function evaluation (PFE) is a special case
of MPC, where the function to be computed is known by only one party. PFE is
useful in several real-life applications where an algorithm or a function itself needs
to remain secret for reasons such as protecting intellectual property or security clas-
sification level. Recently, designing efficient PFE protocols have been a challenging
and attractive task for cryptography researchers.
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In this dissertation, we mainly focus on improving two-party private function eval-
uation (2PFE) schemes. Our primary goal is enhancing the state-of-the-art by
designing secure and cost-efficient 2PFE protocols for both symmetric and asym-
metric cryptography based solutions. In this respect, we first aim to improve 2PFE
protocols based on (mostly) symmetric cryptographic primitives. We look back at
the seminal PFE framework presented by Mohassel and Sadeghian at Eurocrypt’13.
We show how to adapt and utilize the well-known half gates garbling technique (Za-
hur et al., Eurocrypt’15) to their constant round 2PFE scheme. Compared to their
scheme, our resulting optimization significantly improves both underlying oblivious
extended permutation (OEP) and secure 2-party computation (2PC) protocols, and
yields a more than 40% reduction in overall communication cost. We next propose
a novel and highly efficient 2PFE scheme based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption. Our scheme consists of two protocols, one is utilized in the ini-
tial execution, and the other is in the subsequent runs. One of the novelties of our
scheme over the state-of-the-art is that it results in a significant cost reduction when
the same private function is evaluated more than once between the same or varying
parties. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most efficient and the first 2PFE
scheme that enjoys reusability feature. Our protocols achieve linear communication
and computation complexities, and a constant number of rounds which is at most
three (depending on the size of the inputs of the party that holds the function).
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O¨ZET
GI˙ZLI˙ FONKSI˙YON DEG˘ERLENDI˙RME I˙C¸I˙N
VERI˙MLI˙ VE GU¨VENLI˙ S¸EMALAR
MUHAMMED ALI˙ BI˙NGO¨L
Doktora Tezi, Ocak 2019
Danıs¸man: Prof. Dr. Albert Levi
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Kriptografik Protokoller, Gizli Fonksiyon Deg˘erlendirme,
Gu¨venli Hesaplama, I˙letis¸im ve Hesaplama Karmas¸ıklıg˘ı, Gu¨venlik Analizi.
Hesaplama cihazlarının gelis¸mesi ve Internet’in yaygınlas¸ması ile birlikte is¸birlikc¸i
hesaplama ic¸in bu¨yu¨k imkanlar dog˘mus¸tur. Bir fonksiyon veya algoritma u¨zerinde
ortak hesaplama ihtiyacı, birbirlerine gu¨venen, kısmen gu¨venen veya kesinlikle gu¨ven-
meyen taraflar arasında olabilmektedir. Literatu¨rde gu¨venli c¸ok taraflı hesaplama
(I˙ng. multi-party computation - MPC) olarak bilinen protokoller, iki veya daha fazla
tarafın, gu¨venilir bir u¨c¸u¨ncu¨ tarafa ihtiyac¸ duymadan ortak bir fonksiyonu birlikte
hesaplamalarına imkan sag˘lar. Ancak MPC ic¸in o¨nerilen genel c¸o¨zu¨mler, fonksiy-
onun kendisinin de hassas oldug˘u ve gizli tutulması gerektig˘i bazı o¨zel durumlar ic¸in
yeterli deg˘ildir. Gizli fonksiyon deg˘erlendirme (I˙ng. private function evaluation -
PFE) fonksiyonun yalnızca bir tarafc¸a bilinmesine imkan sag˘layan o¨zel bir MPC du-
rumuna kars¸ılık gelir. PFE protokolleri, bir algoritma veya bir fonksiyonun gizlilik
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seviyesi veya fikri mu¨lkiyeti gibi nedenlerle gizli kalmasını gerektiren c¸es¸itli problem-
ler ic¸in c¸o¨zu¨m sag˘lar. Son zamanlarda, verimli PFE protokollerinin tasarlanması,
kriptografi aras¸tırmacıları ic¸in zorlayıcı ve ilgi c¸eken bir alan haline gelmis¸tir.
Bu tez c¸alıs¸masında iki taraflı gizli fonksiyon deg˘erlendirme (I˙ng. two-party
private function evaluation - 2PFE) protokollerinin gelis¸tirilmesi hedeflenmis¸tir.
O¨ncelikli hedefimiz, simetrik ve asimetrik s¸ifreleme kategorilerinde gu¨venli ve daha
verimli PFE protokolleri tasarlayarak literatu¨ru¨ bu alandaki c¸alıs¸malarımız ile gelis¸tir-
mektir. Bu amac¸la, ilk olarak simetrik kriptografik yapıtas¸larına dayalı 2PFE pro-
tokollerini gelis¸tirmeyi amac¸ladık. Eurocrypt’13’te Mohassel ve Sadeghian tarafından
sunulan ve bu kategorideki en iyi sonuc¸lar ortaya koyan PFE protokolu¨nu¨ ele aldık.
I˙yi bilinen yarım kapılı karmas¸ık devreler teknig˘ininin (Zahur et al., Eurocrypt’15)
2PFE s¸emasına nasıl uyarlayıp kullanacag˘ını go¨sterdik. Protokoleri kars¸ılas¸tırdıg˘ımız-
da, sonuc¸ta elde ettig˘imiz optimizasyonumuz, hem kayıtsız genis¸letilmis¸ permu¨tasyon
(I˙ng. oblivious extended permutation - OEP) hem de gu¨venli iki taraflı hesaplama
(I˙ng. two-party computation - 2PC) alt protokollerinin verimlilig˘ini o¨nemli o¨lc¸u¨de
iyiles¸tirmis¸ ve iletis¸im maliyetinde % 40’ın u¨zerinde verimlilik sag˘lamıs¸tır. Bunun
yanı sıra, kararsal Diffie-Hellman (I˙ng. decisional Diffie-Hellman - DDH) varsayımına
dayanan yeni ve o¨zgu¨n 2PFE s¸eması o¨nermekteyiz. S¸emamız, literatu¨rdeki c¸alıs¸maları
o¨nemli o¨lc¸u¨de gelis¸tirmekle birlikte yeniden kullanılabilirlik o¨zellig˘ini sunarak son-
raki hesaplamalar ic¸in verimlilig˘i oldukc¸a arttırır. O¨nerdig˘imiz s¸emamız iki pro-
tokolden olus¸maktadır, birincisi fonksiyonunun ilk defa uygulamasında, ikincisi ise
sonraki uygulamalarda kullanılır. Bildig˘imiz kadarıyla, o¨nermis¸ oldug˘umuz bu s¸ema,
literatu¨rdeki en verimli ve yeniden kullanılabilirlik o¨zellig˘ine sahip ilk 2PFE tasarımı-
dır. O¨nermis¸ oldug˘umuz protokoller lineer iletis¸im ve hesaplama karmas¸ıklıklarına
sahipken protokollerin mesaj tur sayısı en fazla u¨c¸tu¨r.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that one invents a novel and practical algorithm capable of being directly
used to detect and identify criminals in crowds with a high degree of precision
based on information about their behaviors obtained from street video recordings.
It is obvious that this algorithm would be commercially valuable and that many
governmental organizations would like to use it. The inventor has the right to keep
the algorithm confidential, and to offer only its use for a certain fee since it is
his/her own intellectual property. On the other hand, governmental organizations
will generally be unwilling to reveal their records and databases to the parties to
whom they do not sufficiently trust. This is an example of the problem that two
parties would like to execute a common function with their private inputs and the
function is also a private input of one of the parties. Solution for this and such
real-life problems are addressed by Private Function Evaluation (PFE).
PFE is a special case of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in which n par-
ticipants jointly compute a function f on their private inputs x1, . . . , xn, and one (or
some) of the parties obtain the result f(x1, . . . , xn) while revealing nothing more to
the parties. The difference of PFE from the standard MPC setting is that here the
function f is also a private input of one of the participants1. A PFE solution would
1Note that PFE also covers the case where the party who owns the function does not have any
other private input.
1
be more useful than conventional MPC in various real-life applications, e.g., the ones
where the function itself contains private information, or reveals security weaknesses,
or the ones where service providers prefer hiding their function, or its specific imple-
mentation as their intellectual property, or the implementation of the function (say
Cf ) is an intellectual proprietary albeit the function f is public [3–11]. Efficient and
practical PFE schemes are becoming increasingly important as many applications
require protection of their valuable assets such as private database management
systems [12], privacy-preserving intrusion detection system [13], privacy-preserving
checking for creditworthiness [7] and privacy preserving medical applications [11].
Therefore, the task of designing efficient custom PFE protocols for special or general
purposes is addressed in several papers in the literature [9, 14–21].
1.1 Motivation
The task of designing secure and efficient PFE protocols is becoming increasingly
important as many real-world applications require protection of their valuable assets.
For example, many software companies targeting the global market are extremely
concerned about illegal reproduction of their software products. Software obfusca-
tion methods usually prevent reverse engineering, but still allow direct copying of
programs. Another solution could be providing the software-as-a-service in the cloud
to eliminate the risk of exposure. However, this solution also causes another issue,
i.e., threatening the privacy of customer data, since computations need to take place
at the hands of software vendors. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can also be
a potential solution to such problems [22, 23], but, unfortunately, it is still far from
being practical [24]. Another decent approach targeting those problems falls into
the category of PFE. Compared to FHE, PFE is currently much closer to practical
use. Moreover, in many occasions, PFE schemes are quite beneficial, including the
ones where a service provider may opt keeping the functionality and/or its specific
implementation confidential, and the ones where the disclosure of the function itself
2
means revelation of sensitive information, or causes a security weakness.
Moreover, Lipmaa et al. [25] and Sadeghian [26] mention this open problem:
“the various optimizations that are recently proposed for MPC [1,27,28] are making
general 2PC more practical and it is not obvious if their techniques can also be com-
bined with custom PFE solutions (which remains as an interesting open question)”
(see [26, p. 98] and [25, p. 2]). One of the aims of this dissertation is providing an
answer to this open question and come up with an efficient 2PFE protocol.
Furthermore, the current research goal for secure computation protocols (in-
cluding PFE) is efficient and practical solutions with low round, communication,
and computation complexities. Among these three measures, as also pointed out
by Beaver, Micali, and Rogaway, the number of rounds is the most valuable re-
source [29]. The other important research goal in this area is the minimization of
communication complexity. Since hardware trends show that computation power
progresses more rapidly compared to communication channels, the main bottleneck
for many applications will be the bandwidth usage.
1.2 Contributions
The results of this dissertation substantially improve the state-of-the-art by propos-
ing more efficient PFE schemes in both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
categories. The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
We first focus on improving 2-party private function evaluation (2PFE) based on
symmetric cryptographic primitives. In this respect, we first revisit the state-of-the-
art Mohassel and Sadeghian’s PFE framework [17], then propose a more efficient
protocol (secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries) by adapting the half
gates garbling optimization [1] to their 2PFE scheme. Note that in [30], Wang and
Malluhi mention that “free-XOR [27] and half gates [1] techniques cannot be used
to improve the efficiency of non-universal circuit based custom PFE protocols such
as Katz and Malka’s [9] and Mohassel and Sadeghian’s [17] works”. In contrast to
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their claim, we adapt and utilize half gates approach to Mohassel and Sadeghian’s
and reduce the communication cost in a secure way. Our protocol in this category
achieves the following significant improvements in both OSN and 2PC phases:
1. Regarding the OSN phase: (1) We reduce the number of required OTs by
N = 2g. Concretely, the technique in [17] requires 2N log(N) + 1 OTs, while
our protocol requires 2N log(N) − N + 1 OTs. (2) Our protocol reduces the
data sizes entering the OSN protocol by a factor of two. This improvement
results in about 40% saving.
2. Regarding the 2PC phase, our scheme garbles each non-output gate (that does
not have any direct connection with output wires of the circuit) with only three
ciphertexts, and each output gate with only two ciphertexts.
Among the above improvements, the foremost gain comes from the reduction in
the input sizes of the OSN protocol. The overall communication cost of our scheme is
(6N log(N)+0.5N +3)λ bits2, which is a significant improvement compared to [17],
whose communication cost is (10N log(N) + 4N + 5)λ bits. This means more than
40% saving in bandwidth size (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). Also, the overall
computation cost is also slightly decreased while the number of rounds remains
unchanged. We show that our resulting 2PFE scheme is secure in the semi-honest
model.
We also propose a highly efficient 2PFE scheme for Boolean circuits based on the
DDH assumption which utilizes asymmetric cryptographic primitives. Our scheme
enjoys the cost reduction due to the reusability of tokens that will be used in the
2PC stage. This eliminates some of the computations and exchanged messages in
the subsequent executions for the same function. Therefore, one of the strongest
aspects of our proposed protocol is the remarkable cost reduction if the same function
is evaluated more than once (possibly on varying inputs). We highlight that such a
cost reduction is not applicable to the protocols of KM11 [9] and MS13 [17] since
2λ is the security parameter throughout this thesis.
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they require running the whole protocol from scratch for each execution. In this
respect, we present two protocols of our scheme: (1) a protocol for initial executions
(InExe), (2) a resumption protocol for subsequent executions (ReExe). The former
protocol is utilized in the first evaluation of the function, while the latter one is
utilized in the second or later subsequent evaluations of the same function between
the two parties. We note that the latter protocol is more efficient than the former one
due to the fact that it benefits from the reusable tokens generated already in InExe
protocol. The latter case is likely to be encountered more frequently in practice,
compared to the cases where the function is evaluated just once between the two
given parties.
Our proposed protocols significantly enhance the state-of-the-art in terms of com-
munication cost. Compared to MS13-OSN [17], BBKL18 [20], and GKS17 [19] pro-
tocols, our scheme asymptotically reduces the communication cost. Namely, while
the asymptotic communication costs of those protocols are equal to O(g log(g)), our
scheme provides O(g) communication complexity where g is the number of gates. To
illustrate the significance of this asymptotic difference, for a thousand-gate circuit,
our cost reduction is about 94% over MS13-OSN, about 88% over BBKL18, and
about 68% over GKS17. For a billion-gate circuit, our cost reduction is about 98%
over MS13-OSN, about 96% over BBKL18, and about 89% over GKS17. The proto-
cols of MS13-HE, KM11-1st, KM11-2nd and ours has linear asymptotic complexity.
Thanks to the reusability feature, the advantage of our scheme becomes more con-
spicuous when the number of PFE execution is more than one. Namely, for two
executions our cost reduction is about 54% over KM11-1st, 30% over KM11-2nd,
and 20% over MS13-HE. For ten executions our cost reduction is about 63% over
KM11-1st, 44% over KM11-2nd, and 37% over MS13-HE. The number of rounds of
our InExe protocol is 3 and the number of rounds of our ReExe protocol is equal to
1, or 2, or 3 depending on the input string length of Party1 (i.e., owner of f)
3. This
3If Party1 has x1 = ⊥, then the number of rounds is equal to 1. If Party1 has a non-empty input
x1 such that the OT extension is not applicable for its garbled input, then it is to 2. Otherwise,
the number of rounds is equal to 3.
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also reflects the improvement of ReExe protocol over the existing 2PFE protocols in
terms of round complexity (see Table 5.1).
We also deal with the case that Party1 runs the 2PFE protocol for the same
private function with various Party2s separately. This is a common scenario where
Party1 may run a business with many customers for her algorithm/software. Triv-
ially, our ReExe protocol can be utilized between the same two parties in the second
and subsequent evaluations after the first evaluation. Instead of running the initial
execution protocol with each Party2, we propose a more efficient mechanism for the
generation of the reusable tokens by employing a threshold based system.
1.3 Organization
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: In Chapter 2, we give necessary
background information about cryptographic primitives and secure computation &
garbled circuits. In Chapter 3, we review the literature on existing PFE approaches.
In Chapter 4, we introduce our (mostly) symmetric-based 2PFE scheme. This chap-
ter provides the detailed explanation of our protocol then a simulation-based security
proof of our scheme in the semi-honest model. Also, the chapter covers an analy-
sis of our protocol in terms of communication and computation complexities and
comparison with the state-of-the-art. Chapter 5 presents our highly efficient mech-
anism for improving asymmetric cryptography based 2PFE schemes. We describe
our two new methods to achieve more efficient PFE between the two parties and
in the presence of multiple Party2s. Also, this chapter provides the complexities of
our resulting protocols and compares them with the existing state-of-the-art 2PFE
protocols. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and point out some future
works.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
INFORMATION
This chapter provides some background information on some general concepts and
definitions. We begin this chapter by defining some cryptographic primitives that
are used throughout this dissertation. Then we give a brief overview on basics
of secure computation, Yao’s garbled circuits and recent optimizations on Yao’s
scheme. Additional preliminaries and definitions, which are specific to some parts
of the dissertation, appear within the related chapters.
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we give definitions of some cryptographic primitives that are utilized
throughout this dissertation. Most of the definitions given in this section have
become standard, and are widely used in cryptography.
2.1.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptosystems
Definition 2.1.1. Cryptosystem. A cryptosystem is a quintuple (P , C,K, E ,D) with
the following properties:
7
1. Let P be the plaintext space, C be the ciphertext space, and K be the keyspace,
where P , C and K are finite sets.
2. Ek is an encryption function such that Ek : P ×K → C, and Dk is an encryp-
tion function such that Dk : C × K → P, where k ∈ K.
3. For each key ke ∈ K, there exists some key kd ∈ K such that for each plaintext
p ∈ P, Dkd(Eke(p)) = p.
A cryptosystem is said to be symmetric-key cryptosystem (or private-key cryp-
tosystem) if either of the following holds: (1) kd = ke or (2) kd can “easily” be
determined from ke. A cryptosystem is said to be asymmetric cryptosystem (or
public-key cryptosystem) if kd 6= ke and it is “computationally infeasible” to deter-
mine the private key kd from the corresponding public key ke.
2.1.2 Some Computational Problems
We now give some standard definitions of computational hardness and some as-
sumptions that are hitherto known as hard problems. A polynomial time Turing
machine is one which halts within p(|x|) steps on any input string x with length
|x| where p denotes some polynomials. A probabilistic Turing machine is allowed
to make random choices in its execution such that on each step it chooses the next
configuration randomly from the possible ones [31–33].
Definition 2.1.2. ( Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) Turing Machine.) A
Turing machine M is said to be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) Turing ma-
chine if it takes input x together with a string of random bits r and ∃c ∈ N such
that M(x, r) always halts in xc steps.
Definition 2.1.3. (Negligible Function.) A function (x) : N 7→ R is negligible if
and only if ∀c ∈ N, ∃x0 ∈ N such that ∀x ≥ x0
(x) <
1
xc
.
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Let A be a PPT algorithm and (·) is a negligible function. A problem is said
to be “easy” if it can be solved by a PPT A with respect to the size of the input.
Let (G, ·) be a finite cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of order |G| and g is a generator.
For this given group the definitions of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), Com-
putational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem and Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
Problem are as follows.
Definition 2.1.4. (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).) The DLP states that for
any PPT A, there exists a negligible function (·) such that given gx ∈ G, the
probability of finding x is
Pr[x← A(〈g〉 , g, gx)] ≤ (|G|).
Definition 2.1.5. (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem.) The CDH
problem states that for any PPT A, there exists a negligible function (·) such that
given gx, gy ∈ G the probability of finding gxy is
Pr[gxy ← A(〈g〉 , g, gx, gy)] ≤ (|G|).
Definition 2.1.6. (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem.) The DDH problem
states that for any PPT A, there exists a negligible function (·) such that given
gx, gy ∈ G and χ, the probability of distinguishing gxy from a randomly chosen
element gr ∈ G is
∣∣∣∣Pr[β ← A(〈g〉 , g, gx, gy, χ)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (|G|), where χ =
g
xy, if β = 0
gr, otherwise.
9
2.1.3 Hash Functions
A hash function is a deterministic mapping [34,35] defined as below.
Definition 2.1.7. (Hash Function.) A function H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}`, mapping
arbitrary-length bit strings to a fixed length `-bit strings is called a hash function,
where ` ∈ Z and ` ≥ 0. Function H is called a cryptographic hash function that
satisfies the following properties:
– Computability: For any given input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, y = H(x) is computed in
a polynomially bounded time.
– One-wayness: Given an `-bit string y, for any PPT A, there exist a negligible
function (·) such that
Pr[y ∈ {0, 1}`;x← A(1`, H, y) : H(x) = y] ≤ (`).
This property is also known as “pre-image resistance”.
– 2nd pre-image resistance: Given a bit string x, for any PPT A, there exist
a negligible function (·) such that
Pr[x1 ← {0, 1}∗; y1 = H(x1);x2 ← A(1`, H, y1) : x1 6= x2∧H(x1) = H(x2)] ≤ (`).
This property is also known as “weak collision resistance”.
– Collision resistance: For any PPT A, there exist a negligible function (·)
such that
Pr[(x1, x2)← A(1`, H) : x1 6= x2 ∧H(x1) = H(x2)] ≤ (`).
This property is also known as “strong collision resistance”.
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In general, collision resistance (strong collision resistance) implies 2nd pre-image
resistance (weak collision resistance) but collision resistance need not imply one-
wayness [32,34,36,37]. We treat cryptographic hash functions as random oracles as
they satisfy the following definition.
Definition 2.1.8. (Random Oracles.) A function H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}` is said to
be a random oracle if given any PPT A, there exist a negligible function (·) such
that ∣∣∣∣Pr[β ← A(y)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (`), where y =
H(x), if β = 0r ∈ {0, 1}`, otherwise.
Namely, in the random oracle model, a cryptographic hash function H viewed
as a random oracle that responds to every query with a random response chosen
uniformly from {0, 1}` [38, 39].
2.1.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Let Fp be a finite field with p > 3 a large prime. Also let E(Fp) = {(x, y) ∈ F2p:
y2 = x3 + ax + b where a, b ∈ Fp with 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 } ∪ {O}, where O denotes
the point at infinity. In general, for security purposes, the order of E(Fp) has a
large prime factor and a few other small factors, called cofactors. The order of
E(Fp) must be kq where q is a large prime, and k is the cofactor. Let G be a cyclic
subgroup of large prime order q of E(Fp). The security of the system is based on
the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the subgroup G.
A base point (generator) of the group G can be found by first finding a random
element x0 ∈ Fp such that y20 = x30 + ax0 + b for some y0 ∈ Fp, then multiplying it
by the cofactor k as P := k · (x0, y0). Thanks to the Lagrange theorem, if P 6= O,
then it is a base point of order q. For the other generators of the group, just pick a
random element ri ∈ Z∗q, then Pi := ri · P is also another base point of the group G
(due to the fact that gcd(ri, q) = 1, ∀ri ∈ Z∗q) [40–44].
Throughout this dissertation, points on an elliptic curve are represented by cap-
ital letters while scalars are represented by lower-case letters.
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2.1.5 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption is a form of cryptosystem as defined below.
Definition 2.1.9. (Homomorphic Encryption.) The encryption algorithm E is ho-
momorphic if given any two encryptions E(p1) and E(p2), one can obtain E(p1 ?p2)
without decrypting the cyphertexts E(p1) and E(p2) for some operation “?” and
∀p1, p2 ∈ P.
In general, the operation ? is either addition or multiplication because these
operations are functionally complete sets over finite sets. Homomorphic encryption
systems are useful cryptographic tools since it allows operations on encrypted data
as if it had been performed on the plaintexts without the need for the decryption
key. Such cryptosystems have natural applications in privacy-preserving, secure
computations. The homomorphic encryption schemes can be addressed in three
categories with respect to the number of applicable operations on the encrypted
message: (i) Partially (singly) HE (PHE), (ii) somewhat HE (SWHE) and (iii)
fully HE (FHE) [45]. In PHE, only one type of operation is allowed without a
bound on the number of operation calls. In literature, there are many cryptosystems
that have PHE property or especially proposed to be so [46–58]. SWHE allows
both types of operations but with a limited number of times. The bound on the
number of operation is due to the fact that the noise grows much faster with the
number of operations. There are several works on SWHE, some of the important
ones are [59–63]. FHE allows all types of operations with an unlimited number of
times by handling the noise using the bootstrapping technique. The first reasonable
FHE scheme was introduced by Craig Gentry in 2009 [22, 23]. Although this was a
breakthrough, several works and implementations hitherto demonstrated that FHE
still needs significant improvement to be able to used in practice [64–71].
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2.1.6 Oblivious Transfer Protocols
Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol was primarily introduced by Rabin [72] and later
Even et al. [73] presented a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol. A 1-out-of-2 OT protocol takes
place between two participants: a sender S and a receiver R, where S’s input is
(m0,m1) and R’s input is b ∈ {0, 1}. The OT must guarantee that after protocol
executions S receives nothing about the selection bit, and R receives only (mb)
corresponds to his input and nothing about (m1−b). Cre´peau [74] later showed that
Rabin’s OT essentially implies 1-out-of-2 OT. In another words, he showed that
using Rabin’s OT one can realize a 1-out-of-2 OT in polynomial number of steps.
We note that 1-out-of-2 OT can also be generalized to k-out-of-n OT protocol
where S has a set of values {x1, . . . , xm}, R has k selection indices. At the end of the
protocol, R only learns k of the S’s inputs according to his selection indices; whereas
S learns nothing. In the OT-hybrid model, the two parties are given access to the
ideal OT functionality (FOT ) which implies a universally composable OT protocol.
Oblivious transfer is a critical underlying protocol used in many MPC constructions
which allows the evaluator to obtain garbled wire tokens corresponding to his/her
private inputs.
OT extension: OT extension is a way of obtaining many OTs from a few numbers
of OT runs and cheap symmetric cryptographic operations. Ishai et al. constructed
the first OT extension method [75], which reduces a given large number of required
OTs to a fixed size security parameter (say n). This is crucial in MPC implementa-
tions especially when the evaluator’s input size is too much.
A protocol for reducing m OTs to n OTs is as follows. Sender S’s inputs:
(x01, x
1
1), . . . , (x
0
m, x
1
m) and receiver R’s input: σ = σ1, . . . , σm. The sender S samples
a random string s ∈ {0, 1}n; denote s = s1, . . . , sn. The receiver R samples n
random strings T1, . . . , Tn ∈ {0, 1}m. For i = 1, . . . , n, Now S and R run a new
sub-OT protocol as R plays the sender and inputs the pair (Ti, Ti ⊕ σ) and S plays
the receiver and inputs si. Denote the output of S by Qi (Qi = Ti if si = 0, and
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Qi = Ti ⊕ σ if si = 1).
Let Q be the m × n matrix [Q1| · · · |Qn];Q(i) = ith row. Let T be the m × n
matrix [T1| · · · |Tn];T (i) = ith row. For i = 1, . . . ,m:
• S sends y0i = x0i ⊕H(i, Q(i)) and y1i = x1i ⊕H(i, Q(i)⊕ s).
• R outputs zi = yσii ⊕H(i, T (i)).
Later, several OT extension schemes based on [75] are proposed for improving
the efficiency [76,77].
2.2 Basics of Secure Computation and Garbled
Circuits
This section provides background information about secure computation and the
garbled circuit scheme for secure computation originally proposed by Yao and some
primitives for formal security analysis.
Secure computation protocols allow two or more mutually (possibly distrustful)
parties to collaborate and compute a public functionality using their private inputs.
Secure computation got a lot of attention in recent years due to its advantages for
cloud computing and secure outsourcing. Consider the following real-life problems.
• Alice wants to investigate her DNA because of her suspicious about an inher-
ent genetic disease. She is aware of a database (e.g. a cloud service) which
contains DNA sequences about numerous genetic diseases. Once Alice gets a
sample of her DNA sequence, she can make a query to the database, who will
then declare Alice the possible diagnosis. On the other hand, in case Alice is
concerned about her personal privacy, the above naive procedure is not appli-
cable because it does not prevent Alice’s private information both the query
(DNA information) and the result (diagnosis) [78]. The database query prob-
lem can also mandate that the server does not learn not only the user query but
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also the answer to the query. Besides, the service may also need data privacy
due to accountability concerns. For instance, in case the service is charging for
answering each query, than he wants to make sure that no information other
then the answer to a single query is leaked at each transaction.
• The number of orbits around the Earth is nearly 7,000 spacecraft, orbital de-
bris larger than 10 centimeters are routinely tracked and their number exceeds
21,000. It is reasonable that competitor countries do not want to leak the
position information of their vital strategic satellite orbits. Besides, space
satellites are a huge investment and the owners would like to keep their satel-
lites alive in the space as long as possible. Satellites are able to approximate
their positions on the space. These data can be analyzed to predict collisions
and hopefully react to the more critical results. Once the satellite pairs with
a sufficiently high collision risk have been found, the satellite operators should
exchange more detailed information and determine if a collision is imminent
and decide if the trajectory of either object should be modified [79].
The common focus of the above-mentioned illustrations is the following: The
parties would like to execute a specific function on their confidential inputs, and
learn the output result, but neither party is permitting to reveal its own input. The
problem is how to handle such cooperative computation problems without revealing
the privacy of the party’s inputs and eliminate the need of a trusted third party.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a strong candidate approach as a solution
to these problems. In order to that parties can obtain the output of a desired function
by engaging in a protocol where they exchange some messages. The ultimate aim
is that nothing is revealed aside from the output of the protocol as the value of the
function.
Other examples of such computations include real-life applications such as: vot-
ing over the Internet [80–83], electronic bidding [84,85], financial data analysis [86],
privacy preserving data mining [87,88] data sharing & analytics [89–91], blockchain
solutions [92–97], etc. For more reading on applications of MPC, we refer to [98–102].
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In fact, there is no bound for the fields where MPC could be applied, and it can be
adopted in any relevant cases.
A secure two-party computation protocol allows two parties to compute a com-
mon function using their private inputs without leaking any information except the
output. The concept is appeared in the 1980-s by the seminal work of Andrew Yao,
but the original have been far too inefficient for practical use. The very classical
garbled circuit construction methods require four ciphertexts per gate, although a
quite large effort has been put into reducing this cost. The two-party MPC is an
important special case, which received a lot of targeted attention [98], and because
two-party protocols are often different from the generic n-party case (in terms of
protocol efficiency etc.), we use the abbreviation 2PC to emphasize this special case
as needed.
2.2.1 Yao’s Garbled Circuit
In 1980s Andrew Yao has shown that secure two-party protocols can be constructed
for any computable function [103,104]. In Yao’s protocol, the function is represented
as a Boolean circuit and it is quite efficient in terms of number of rounds, which is
constant. The original protocol is secure in the semi-honest adversary model.
In a nutshell, Yao’s garbled circuit protocol allows two parties (garbler and eval-
uator) having inputs x1 and x2 to evaluate a function f(x1, x2) without revealing
any information about their private inputs beyond the function output. The ba-
sic concept is that the garbler computes an encrypted form of the circuit Cf ; then
the evaluator obliviously obtains the output of Cf without retrieving any private
intermediate values.
Beginning with the Boolean circuit Cf (in which both parties agreed upon in
advance), the garbler associates two garbled tokens X0i and X
1
i for each wire i of
the circuit (X0i corresponds to the semantic value 0 and X
1
i to 1). Then, for each
two-fan-in and one-fan-out gate g of the circuit with input wires i, j and output wire
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y, the garbler computes the following four ciphertexts for all inputs bi, bj ∈ {0, 1}.
Ency
X
bi
i ,X
bj
j
(
Xg(bi,bj)y
)
(2.1)
This results in four random ordered ciphertexts that yield a garbled gate. In the
end, the collection of garbled gates constitutes the garbled circuit which is sent to
the evaluator.
In order to perform the garbled circuit evaluation, the evaluator needs the garbled
tokens (keys) corresponding to each party’s input wires. The garbler can simply send
(in plaintext form) the keys that correspond to her own inputs. For the evaluator’s
inputs, the parties should run an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol. In addition,
the garbler sends a mapping that reveals the resulting output-wire tokens to the
semantic output bits.
2.2.2 Optimizations on Yao’s Scheme
In the past, academicians had a various prediction regarding the applicability of
Yao’s scheme. In 1997, Goldwasser [105] states that: “The field of multi-party
computations is today where public-key cryptography was ten years ago, namely an
extremely powerful tool and rich theory whose real-life usage is at this time only
beginning but will become in the future an integral part of our computing reality”.
However, Goldreich [106] points out that using the solutions derived by general
results for the special case of multi-party computation could be impractical; special
solutions should be developed and tailored for special cases for efficiency reasons.
The past few years have seen much progress in constructing secure and efficient
secure multi-party schemes using garbled circuits. With the recent improvements,
the garbled circuit approach is now believed to be a feasible solution for real-life
secure computation problems.
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Recently, several important optimizations have been proposed that improves
either the garbled circuit construction, or the computation of both the garbler and
the evaluator, or the bandwidth efficiency. Some of the major optimizations are point
and permute [107], free-XOR [27], garbled row reduction [84, 108], pipelining [109],
dual-key cipher [2], miniLEGO [110], fleXOR [28], and half gates technique [1].
All these optimizations mostly consider the semi-honest adversary model. With
the recent improvements, Yao’s protocol has now very impressive results in terms
of complexity and communication bandwidth requirements. We now give a brief
summary of some of the seminal ones.
Point and permute
The simple version of Yao’s method basically decrypts all ciphertexts which demand
on four decryptions per gate to evaluate the circuit. In [107], an elegant method is
introduced which reduces the circuit evaluator’s work from four decryptions to one.
In this method for each wire i, garbler chooses w0i , w
1
i and a signal bit σi. The basic
intuition is that if σi equals 0, then write the ciphertexts that use w
0
i first; otherwise,
write them second. The order of the ciphertexts for general σi and σj is as follows:
c0 = Ewσii
(
E
w
σj
j
(
w
g(σi,σj)
k ||σk ⊕ g(σi, σj)
))
c1 = Ewσii
(
E
w
σ¯j
j
(
w
g(σi,σ¯j)
k ||σk ⊕ g(σi, σ¯j)
))
c2 = Ewσ¯ii
(
E
w
σj
j
(
w
g(σ¯i,σj)
k ||σk ⊕ g(σ¯i, σj)
))
c3 = Ewσ¯ii
(
E
w
σ¯j
j
(
w
g(σ¯i,σ¯j)
k ||σk ⊕ g(σ¯i, σ¯j)
))
The evaluator uses these keys wσii ||φi and wφjj ||φj to decrypt the ciphertext at
that position φi, φj. By doing this evaluator will recover w
g(bi,bj)
k ||φk where φk =
σk ⊕ g(bi, bj) as desired.
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Free-XOR
Kolesnikov and Schneider [27] present an influential approach that removes the need
of garbling XOR gates (so XOR gates become free, incurring no communication or
cryptographic operations). They proposed picking a global random value R and a
single random token w0i for wire i, and setting the token for the complement one
as w1i = w
0
i ⊕ R. If k is the output wire of an XOR gate, then w0k = w0i ⊕ w0j and
w1k = w
0
k ⊕R. On the both garbler and evaluator side the XOR operation is simple.
Consider an XOR gate with input wires i, j and output wire k and given input
garbled wire values wi and wj. We want to compute wk = wi⊕wj. Let wi = wαi and
wj = w
β
j . If α = β = 0 then wk = w
0
i ⊕w0j = w0k = w0i ⊕R⊕w0j ⊕R = w0k. Non-XOR
gates (such as AND, OR etc.) are computed as usual (with w1k = w
0
k ⊕R).
Free-XOR method remarkably reduces the complexity of the garbled circuits in
terms of both computation and communication and become a seminal work that
took a big step towards making MPC practical.
On the other hand, the security of Free-XOR method is questioned by Choi et
al. [111]. Kolesnikov and Schneider proved (somehow) security of their approach
in the random oracle model, and claimed that correlation robustness is sufficient for
their scheme. However, Choi et al. [111] showed that the free-XOR technique is
not secure based on correlation robustness alone and some form of circular security
is also needed. This work also demonstrates that correlation robustness is strictly
weaker than circular-correlation robustness that means weaker than also random
oracle model.
Garbled row reduction
From the end of the 90s, the focus mostly turns to reducing the bandwidth overhead
since it seems to be one of the most important bottlenecks for secure computation
protocols. Naor et al. [84] introduced two types of optimizations for row reductions in
a garbled scheme to reduce bandwidth consumption. These optimizations are later
formally described by Pinkas et all. [108]. Naor et al. [84] presented an optimization
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for reducing the standard 4-ciphertext garbled gates to three ciphertexts. In this
optimization, one of the ciphertexts is fixed to an all-zeros bit string. Since one of
the rows is set to always consist of all-zeros, then it does not actually need to be
included in the garbled table. Result of decryption of this all-zeros row gives one of
the tokens.
Later Pinkas et al. in [108] proposed a technique to reduce the size of a garbled
table from four to three ciphertexts, thus saving 25% of network bandwidth. This
method is also known as the GRR3 method as it requires to send three ciphertexts
per gate in the communication channel. The method is as follows:
• Let i and j be the input wires and let k be the output wire
– Set (w
g(σi,σj)
k ||σk ⊕ g(σi, σj)) =: H(wσii ||wσjj )
– When using the free-XOR technique, set w1−bk = w
b
k⊕R otherwise, choose
it at random.
– Construct ciphertexts c2, c3, c4 as usual
• When computing the gate:
– If both signal bits equal 0 (i.e., α⊕σj = β⊕σj = 0), then don’t decrypt;
just derive w
g(σi,σj)
k and σk ⊕ g(σi, σj) by computing H(wσii ||wσjj )
– Otherwise decrypt one of c2, c3, c4 as usual
In [108] another garbled row reduction variant called GRR2 is proposed for re-
ducing the bandwidth size to two ciphertexts per gate. GRR2 involves computing
polynomial interpolation and a modified version of secret sharing [112]. Therefore,
GRR2 is more costly than the standard PRF or hash function garbling. The perfor-
mance experiments in [108] also show that GRR2 is about three times slower than
the fastest experiment.
In general, GRR is a technique for reducing a standard garbled gate bandwidth
from a size of 4 ciphertexts down to either 3 or 2. However, Free-XOR is only
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compatible with GRR3, but not with the more compressive GRR2 variant. The
underlying reason is that in the GRR2 method, both output wire labels (for 0 and
1) of a gate as fixed pseudorandom functions of the input wire labels. Therefore,
it is not always achievable to guarantee that the output wire labels are of the form
(C,C ⊕R) for the global R value of Free-XOR method.
FleXOR
In [28] Kolesnikov, Mohassel, and Rosulek introduced a generalization of free-XOR
technique called the flexible XOR, shortly fleXOR. In fleXOR technique, an XOR
gate can be garbled using 0, 1, or 2 ciphertexts, depending on the combinatorial
structure of the Boolean circuit and the circuit is complaint with GRR2 applied to
the AND gates. For circuits with many AND gates, this method results in smaller
circuits than with free-XOR. In other cases, free-XOR could be more preferable.
Therefore, the actual benefit of this method is strictly depending on the structure
of the Boolean circuit.
Considering the security of fleXOR, the circularity assumption can be removed
using this technique at some additional cost while the correlation robustness/related
key assumption remains.
Half gates technique
In [1], Zahur, Rosulek, and Evans propose an elegant and efficient garbling scheme
called half gates technique. Their garbling technique is currently known as the most
efficient optimization in terms of communication complexity compared to any prior
scheme. The idea behind the approach is to divide an AND gate into two half AND
gates for which one party knows one of the inputs.
This technique remains compatible with free-XOR [27] while also reducing the
ciphertext requirement for each odd gate1 to two. Here, we briefly describe the
1Odd and Even gates are fan-in-two logic gates. The former has an odd number of TRUE
outputs in its truth table; while the latter has an even number of those.
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Table 2.1: Garbling an odd gate using half gates technique [1].
Garbler half gate (pb known to
the garbler)
Evaluator half gate (pb ⊕ vb known to
the evaluator)
Defines the half gate:
fG(va, pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(α2 ⊕ pb)⊕ α3
Defines the half gate:
fE(va, vb ⊕ pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(pb ⊕ vb)
Computes:
TGc ← H(w0a)⊕H(w1a)⊕ (pb ⊕ α2)R
w0Gc ← H(wpaa )⊕ fG(pa, pb)R
Computes:
TEc ← H(w0b )⊕H(w1b )⊕ wα1a
w0Ec ← H(wpbb )
The garbler sends TGc. The garbler sends TEc.
garbling procedure of odd gates using the half gates technique and refer the reader
to [1] for further details and its security proof.
Any odd gate type can be written in the form of Equation (2.2) where α1, α2
and α3 define the gate type, e.g., setting α1 = 0, α2 = 0, α3 = 1 results in a NAND
gate [1]. Let vi denote the one-bit truth value on the i
th wire in a circuit.
fGodd(va, vb)→ (α1 ⊕ va) ∧ (α2 ⊕ vb)⊕ α3 (2.2)
The garbler garbles an odd gate by following the steps for both half gates in
Table 2.1. The tokens for FALSE and TRUE on the ith wire are denoted as w0i
and wi, respectively. The global free-XOR offset is denoted as R. The garbler sets
R  {0, 1}λ−11 globally, and w0i  {0, 1}λ and w1i ← w0i ⊕ R for each wire. We
have lsb(R) = 1 so that lsb(w0i ) 6= lsb(w1i ). wbGc and wbEc denote the tokens for the
garbler and the evaluator half gate outputs for truth value b, respectively. TGc and
TEc denote the λ-bit strings needing to be sent for the garbler and evaluator half
gates, respectively.
Let wi be a token on i
th wire obtained by the evaluator who does not know
its corresponding truth value vi. For the ith wire, let pi := lsb(w
0
i ), a value only
known to the garbler. If two symbols are appended, an AND operation is implied,
i.e., ab = a ∧ b. H : {0, 1}λ × Z → {0, 1}λ denotes a hash function with circular
correlation robustness for naturally derived keys2, having the security parameter λ.
2Circular correlation robustness for naturally derived keys is the security requirement for a
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The token on the output wire of the odd gate for FALSE is w0Gc ⊕ w0Ec since
the output of the odd gate is an XOR of half gate outputs. The two ciphertexts
computed TGc and TEc are needed to be sent to the evaluator for each gate.
Half gate method presents the best known garbled circuit scheme in terms of
both communication and computation complexity comparing any prior scheme.
2.2.3 Adversary Types
In what follows, we briefly describe the types and intuition for the capabilities of
the semi-honest, covert, and malicious adversaries. For a more detailed discussion,
we refer to [88,113] and for formal definitions [114].
Malicious adversary
A malicious adversary is a kind of active attacker that can arbitrarily deviate from
specification of the protocol and utilizes any effective strategy to retrieve some ad-
ditional knowledge about the other parties private data and/or manipulate the out-
come of the computation. Since this is the strongest type of adversary model, in most
cases, protection against such attacks is excessive and expensive to achieve [115].
In literature, there exist many proposals to provide security malicious model such
as [116–122].
Covert adversary
A covert adversary is also a kind of active attacker that can arbitrarily deviate
from specification of the protocol. Covert adversary is very similar to malicious
adversary but it differs in the sense that the attacker can only be caught with a
given probability (e.g., 1/2) called as the deterrence factor [115,123,124].
suitable hash function used in half gates garbling. We refer the reader to [1] for its details.
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Semi-honest adversary
A semi-honest adversary is a type of passive attacker that executes verbatim the
prescribed steps of the protocol but can record all the intermediate transactions and
make analysis in order to retrieve some additional knowledge about the other parties
private data. This class of attacker also known as honest-but-curious adversary [100,
114]. In fact, several MPC protocols and designs consider the semi-honest model
since this model is highly relevant for numerous real-world applications [84,109,125–
128].
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Chapter 3
RELATED WORKS
In this chapter, we give an overview of the existing private function evaluation
protocols, especially for two parties. First proposed by Andrew Yao [103, 104],
secure two-party computation (2PC) comprises the techniques for joint evaluation of
a function by two parties on their respective secret inputs. In recent years, there has
been promising progress over the original Yao’s protocol [1, 27–29,84,108,129,130].
As a consequence of these improvements, secure computation techniques now have
promising results. 2PFE differs from the standard 2PC in that the latter involves
both parties evaluating a publicly known function on their private inputs, whereas
in the former, the function itself is also a private input. The 2PFE concept is first
appeared in [131, 132]. So far, there are basically two main approaches that PFE
solutions are built upon.
Several proposals in literature have aimed to design efficient special -purpose
and general -purpose PFE protocols. In what follows, we explore the fundamental
approaches on designing PFE solutions which can be classified as general purpose
(universal circuit based) and special purpose PFE protocols. The special purpose
protocols can be divided into two sub-categories (i) (mostly)1 symmetric-based, (ii)
asymmetric-based PFE solutions. We first begin with reviewing the general purpose
1The only asymmetric cryptographic structure is due to the OT operations of underlying 2PC,
therefore it can be considered as symmetric-based (see [19,26]).
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universal circuit based PFE solutions. Next, we explore existing the special purpose
PFE solutions.
3.1 Universal Circuit Based PFE Solutions
The general-purpose PFE solutions reduce the universal circuit [133] based ap-
proach that works with any MPC protocol. The idea is that if the regular secure
computation techniques can be applied on a universal circuit, then a PFE scheme
can be obtained. The ideal functionality of MPC FUg for a universal circuit Ug
takes as input a certain sized (g) Boolean circuit representation Cf of the private
function f , and inputs of parties x1, . . . , xn (i.e., FUg(Cf , x1, . . . , xn)), and outputs
f(x1, . . . , xn). The works based on this approach mainly aim to reduce the size
of universal circuits, and to optimize their implementations using some MPC tech-
niques [14,15,18,19,25]. The early universal circuit based schemes result in massive
circuit sizes [14, 15, 133, 134], which was the root cause of their inefficiency. By the
recent works [18] and [19] the universal circuits approach becomes more practical but
the computation cost is still worse then the special purpose OSN (symmetric) based
protocols of [17,26] and the communication cost is worse than the asymmetric-based
protocols of [9, 17,21].
3.2 Special Purpose PFE Solutions
The second approach falls into designing special purpose PFE protocols which avoids
the use of universal circuits. Following this line of work, several PFE schemes have
been proposed [9, 16, 17, 20, 21, 26, 135]. An early attempt on this category is Paus,
Sadeghi, and Schneider’s work [16]. They introduce -what they called- a semi-private
function evaluation in which the type of the gates is a secret of one party, but the
circuit topology (i.e., the set of all connections of predecessors and successors of
each gate) is public to both parties. Due to the weaker assumption of semi-privacy,
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their approach does not provide a complete PFE solution. A remarkable work
embracing this approach is singly homomorphic encryption based 2PFE scheme
of Katz and Malka (KM11) applied on Boolean circuits [9]. This work utilizes a
singly homomorphic scheme (e.g., ElGamal [50] or Paillier [55]) for the generation
of the two random tokens2 on each wire, later utilized in the 2PC stage. They first
propose a basic version of their protocol in [9, Sect. 3.1] (we call KM11-1st) and
for the efficiency concerns they propose a more efficient variant in [9, Sect. 3.2] (we
call KM11-2nd). Both schemes have only three rounds and provide O(g) asymptotic
complexity in terms of communication and computation, where g denotes the circuit
size. The latter one reduces the communication and oﬄine computation complexity.
In [17], Mohassel and Sadeghian come up with a framework for PFE that includes
several schemes for different settings. They have proposed protocols for both arith-
metic and Boolean circuits. Their protocol for arithmetic circuits (based on partially
HE) has a number of rounds equal to the number of gates (see [17, p. 570]), whereas
the other PFE protocols for Boolean circuits have constant number of rounds. For
large circuits, the number of rounds will be a bottleneck3. For Boolean circuits, they
propose two types of protocols: one is based on partially HE (we call MS13-HE)
and the other one is based on oblivious evaluation of switching networks (we call
MS13-OSN). The MS13-OSN protocol of [17] is (mostly) based on symmetric cryp-
tographic primitives since the only asymmetric cryptographic structure is due to
the OT operations of underlying 2PC. Their proposals are essentially secure in the
semi-honest model and have later been extended to the malicious model by [135].
Even though MS13-OSN is efficient for small sized circuits, it is still inefficient
for large circuits due to its O(g log(g)) communication and computation complexi-
ties. It fails to outperform asymptotically linear communication and computation
2Throughout this dissertation, the term “token” stands for a random bit string generated for a
wire of the Boolean circuit, and has hidden semantics of either 0 or 1.
3We can intuitively say that as the latency between parties increases, so does the cost of each
additional communication round (we refer to [136] that backs up this discussion). A similar analysis
on trade-offs between Boolean and arithmetic circuit based protocols have also been addressed
in [137, p. 527].
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complexities of [9]. On the other hand, MS13-HE provides linear communication
and computation complexities and slightly outperforms KM11-2nd. We remark that
to the best of our knowledge, a reusability feature cannot be adapted4 to protocols
proposed in [9] and [17].
The existing schemes based on asymmetric cryptographic primitives such as [9]
and partially HE based protocol of [17] are promising in terms of linear commu-
nication complexity. However, for some applications, protocols primarily based on
symmetric cryptography could be favorable.
Considering OSN based 2PFE scheme of [17], they split the PFE task into two
sub-functionalities: (1) Circuit topology hiding (CTH), (2) Private gate evalua-
tion (PGE). Briefly speaking, in CTH, a series of procedures is performed: First,
the function owner (say Party1) detaches the interconnections of the gates to ob-
tain single gates, and keeps the topological mapping of the circuit private. Second,
Party1 and the other party (say Party2) engage in an oblivious evaluation of switch-
ing network (OSN)5 protocol which consists of O(g log(g)) oblivious transfer (OT)
operations (throughout this dissertation, g denotes the number of gates, and log()
denotes the logarithm base 2). Next, in PGE, both parties engage in a Yao’s 2-party
computation (2PC) protocol [103, 138] where Party1 and Party2 play the evaluator
and the garbler roles, respectively. Each single gate is garbled into four ciphertexts.
By setting all gates as a single gate type (e.g., NAND or NOR), it is possible to avoid
the necessity of hiding the gate functionality [17].
4This is due to the fact that the blinding operations in these protocols are one-time pads (XOR
or cyclic addition), therefore, reusing the blinded values inevitably leaks information about the
truth values of intermediate wires.
5The OSN mechanism is introduced in [17] to achieve a solution for the oblivious extended
permutation (OEP) problem. OEP allows the oblivious transition of each masked gate output to
the input(s) of the next connected gate(s).
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Recently, in [30], Wang and Malluhi attempt to improve the 2PFE scheme of
Mohassel and Sadeghian by removing only one ciphertext from each garbled gate in
the 2PC phase. However, the communication cost of the 2PC phase is quite lower
than that of the OSN phase, which means that their scheme reduces the overall cost
by less than 1%.
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Chapter 4
AN EFFICIENT 2-PARTY
PRIVATE FUNCTION
EVALUATION PROTOCOL
BASED ON HALF GATES
In this chapter, we mainly focus on improving 2-party private function evaluation
(2PFE) based on (mostly) symmetric cryptographic primitives. This chapter is
based on our work published in The Computer Journal [20]. In Section 4.1, we first
give an introduction on 2PFE framework and scheme of [17] in detail. We formally
present our 2PFE scheme in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides a simulation-based
security proof of our 2PFE scheme in the semi-honest model. In Section 4.4, we
analyze our protocol in terms of communication and computation complexities and
compare it with 2PFE scheme in [17].
4.1 2-Party PFE Framework
In [17], Mohassel and Sadeghian introduce a generic PFE framework for Boolean and
arithmetic circuits. In this work, our focus is mainly on private function evaluation
based on Boolean circuits in 2-party setting (i.e., 2PFE). In order to achieve a secure
2PFE, Mohassel and Sadeghian show that hiding (i) the parties’ private inputs, (ii)
the topology of the circuit representation Cf , and (iii) the functionality of its gates
is required. The framework is not concerned with hiding the numbers of gates,
30
input/output wires and the type of the gates of the circuit. The complete task of
PFE is classified into two functionalities: (1) Circuit Topology Hiding (CTH), (2)
Private Gate Evaluation (PGE).
Throughout this thesis, the party who knows the private function is denoted by
Party1, plays the evaluator role in 2PC; whereas the other party is denoted by Party2
plays the garbler role in 2PC. In a nutshell, in CTH, Party1 extracts the topological
mapping pif (kept private) from the circuit representation Cf and converts the whole
circuit into a collection of single gates. Then Party1 and Party2 engage in an oblivious
evaluation of switching network (OSN) protocol where Party2 obliviously obtains
tokens on gate inputs. In PGE, a 2PC protocol is performed to obtain the final
output. In the rest of this section, we describe the notions related to CTH, and the
2PFE scheme proposed in [17].
4.1.1 Context of CTH
Let n and m denote the number of inputs and outputs of Cf , respectively. Let g be
the number of gates (size of circuit). OW : {ow1, . . . , own+g−m} denotes the set of
outgoing wires which is the union of the input wires of the circuit and the output
wires of its non-output gates (having M = n+g−m elements in total whose indices
are chosen randomly). Similarly, IW : {iw1, . . . , iw2g} denotes the set of incoming
wires which is the input wires of each gate in the circuit (having N = 2g elements
in total whose indices are chosen randomly).
The full description of the topology of a Boolean circuit Cf can be accomplished
by a mapping pif : OW→ IW. The mapping pif maps i to j (i.e., pif (i)→ j), if and
only if owi ∈ OW and iwj ∈ IW correspond to the same wire in the circuit Cf . Note
that the mapping pif is not a function if an outgoing wire corresponds to more than
one incoming wire, while its inverse pi−1f is always a function. Figure 4.1 shows an
example circuit Cf and its mapping pif .
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Figure 4.1: (a) A circuit representation Cf of a function f . (b) The mapping pif of f .
From the inclusion-exclusion principle, we obtain Equation (4.1) that gives the
number of possible mappings for the given M and N values.
ρ =
M∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
M
i
)
(M − i)N (4.1)
In the context of CTH, ρ indicates the number of possible circuit topologies.
Thus, the security of CTH is proportional to ρ. In what follows, we describe the main
elements of CTH functionality whose essential target is the oblivious application of
the mapping pif .
Oblivious evaluation of mapping A mapping of the form pi : {1, . . . , N} →
{1, . . . , N} is a permutation if it is a bijection. We next define the extended permu-
tation (EP) as follows:
Definition 4.1.1 (Extended permutation (EP)). Given the positive integers M and
N , a mapping pi : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , N} is called an EP if for all y ∈ {1, . . . , N},
there exists a unique x ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such that pi(x) = y, and its inverse pi−1 :
{1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . ,M} is an onto function.
The ideal 2-party oblivious extended permutation (2-OEP) functionality is de-
fined as follows:
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Definition 4.1.2 (2-OEP functionality). The first party Party1’s inputs are an EP
pi : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , N}, and a blinding vector for incoming wires T := [tj 
{0, 1}λ] for j = 1, . . . , N . The other party Party2’s inputs are a vector for outgoing
wires W := [wi  {0, 1}λ] for i = 1, . . . ,M . In the end, Party2 learns S := [σj =
wpi−1f (j)
⊕ tj] for j = 1, . . . , N while Party1 learns nothing.
We call any 2-party protocol construction realizing the 2-OEP functionality as
a 2-OEP protocol. Mohassel and Sadeghian have constructed a constant round 2-
OEP protocol by introducing the OSN structure. Since we also utilize their 2-OEP
protocol in our scheme, here we give some of its details. Mainly, they first construct
an extended permutation using switching networks, then provide a method using
OTs for oblivious evaluation of the resulting switching network. We refer our reader
to [17] for the security proof and application of this construction on various MPC
protocols.
EP construction from switching networks. Each 2-switch takes two λ-bit
strings and two selection bits as input, outputting two λ-bit strings [17]. Each of
the outputs may get the value of any of the input strings depending on the selection
bits. This means for input values (x0, x1), there are four different switch output
possibilities. The two selection bits s0 and s1 are used for determining the switch
output (y0, y1). In particular, the switch outputs y0 = xs0 , and y1 = xs1 .
Unlike 2-switches, 1-switches have only one selection bit s. For an input (x0, x1),
a 1-switch outputs one of the two possible outputs: (x0, x1) if s = 0, and (x1, x0)
otherwise.
Definition 4.1.3 (Switching Network (SN)). A switching network SN is a collection
of interconnected switches whose inputs are N λ-bit strings and a set of selection
bits of all switches, and whose outputs are N λ-bit strings.
The mapping pi : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N} related to an SN (pi(i) = j) implies
that when the SN is executed, the string on the output wire j gets the value of that
on the input wire i.
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Figure 4.2: The related switching network for the mapping pif in Figure 4.1.
A permutation network PN is a special type of SN whose mapping is a permu-
tation of its inputs. In contrast to SNs, PNs composed of 1-switches. Waksman
proposes an efficient PN construction in [139]. Mainly, this work suggests that a PN
with N = 2κ inputs can be constructed with N log(N)−N +1 switches. In [17], the
authors propose the construction of an extended permutation by combining SNs and
PNs. However, extended permutations differ from SNs in that the number of their
inputs M and that of their outputs N need not be equal (M ≤ N). N−M additional
dummy inputs are added to the real inputs of an EP pi : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , N}
in order to simulate it as an SN. The SN design for extended permutation is divided
into the following three components (see also Figure 4.2).
1. Dummy placement component. Dummy placement component takes N
input strings composing of real and dummy ones. For each real input that pi
maps to k different outputs, the dummy-value placement component’s output
is the real string followed by k − 1 dummy strings.
2. Replication component. Replication component takes the output of the
dummy-value placement component as input. If a value is real, it goes un-
changed. If it is a dummy value, it is replaced by the real value which precedes
it. This can be computed by a series of N − 1 2-switches whose selection bits
(s0, s1) are either (0,0) or (0,1). If the selection bits are (0,0), that means x1
is dummy, and x0 goes both of the outputs. If they are (0,1), that means both
inputs are real, and both are kept on the outputs in the same order. At the
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end of this step, all the dummy inputs are replaced by the necessary copies of
the real inputs.
3. Permutation component. Permutation component takes the output wires
of the replication component as input. It outputs a permutation of them so
that each string is placed on its final location according to the prescription of
mapping pi.
An efficient implementation of both dummy placement and permutation blocks
is via the use of a Waksman permutation network. Combining these three compo-
nents, one gets a larger switching network, where the number of switches needed is
2(N log(N)−N + 1) +N − 1 = 2N log(N)−N + 1 [17]. The topology of the whole
switching network is the same for all N input EPs, and the selection bits specify the
input values appearing on the outputs.
Oblivious evaluation of switching network (OSN) construction We con-
tinue with describing Mohassel and Sadeghian’s method for oblivious evaluation of
switching networks using OTs.
Adapting the switching network construction to the 2-OEP functionality, Party1
produces the selection bits of the switching network using pi, and has a blinding
vector T . Party2 has an input vector for outgoing wires W . In the end, Party2 learns
the switching network’s blinded output vector for incoming wires S, and Party1
learns ⊥. We describe the oblivious evaluation of one of its building block, i.e., a
single 2-switch u.
Let the input wires of the 2-switch be a and b, and its output wires be c and d.
Each of the four wires of the switch has a uniformly random string assigned by Party2
as her share of that wire in the preparation stage, namely, ra, rb, rc, rd  {0, 1}λ for
a, b, c, d, respectively. Party1 has the strings w1 ⊕ ra and w2 ⊕ rb as his shares for
the two input wires. The purpose is enabling Party1 to obtain his output shares
according to his selection bits. There are four possibilities for Party1’s output shares
depending on his selection bits s0u and s1u (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Party1 learns one of these rows according to his selection bits.
(s0u,s1u) y0 y1
(0,0) w1 ⊕ rc w1 ⊕ rd
(0,1) w1 ⊕ rc w2 ⊕ rd
(1,0) w2 ⊕ rc w1 ⊕ rd
(1,1) w2 ⊕ rc w2 ⊕ rd
Party2 prepares a table with four rows using ra, rb, rc, rd (see Table 4.2). Party1
and Party2 engage in a 1-out-of-4 OT in which Party2 inputs the four rows that she
has prepared, and Party1 inputs his selection bits for the switch u. At the end, Party1
learns one of the rows as the output in the table. Assume that Party1’s selection
bits are (1,0). This means Party1 retrieves the third row, i.e., (rb ⊕ rc, ra ⊕ rd).
According to the his selection bits, Party1 XORs his input share w2⊕ rb with rb⊕ rc,
as well as his other input share w1 ⊕ ra with ra ⊕ rd, and obtains his output shares
w2 ⊕ rc and w1 ⊕ rd.
The oblivious evaluation of the entire SN for EP goes as follows. In an oﬄine
stage, Party2 sets a uniformly random λ-bit string to each wire in the switching
network. Party2 blinds each element of her input vector W and the dummy strings
which she assigned for N −M inputs of the switching network with her correspond-
ing shares for input wires (an XOR operation is involved in each blinding). Party2
prepares tables for each switch in the switching network similar to Table 4.1 and
Table 4.2. However, both tables for each switch in this scenario have two rows
since each switch, in fact, has two possible outputs1. This means each switch in
the entire switching network can be evaluated running 1-out-of-2 OT. Moreover, the
construction permits parallel OT runs and or use of OT extension, resulting in a
constant round scheme. Party2 needs to send her blinded inputs to Party1, which can
be done during her turn in OT extension in order not to increase the round com-
plexity unnecessarily. Once Party1 gets Party2’s blinded inputs which are also his
input shares and the outputs of all OTs, he evaluates the entire switching network in
1For the 1-switches in dummy placement and permutation components, the first and second
rows of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, and for 2-switches in replacement components, the second and
third rows of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 are sufficient.
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Table 4.2: Party1 gets one of these rows by engaging in 1-out-of-4 OT with Party2.
(s0u,s1u) Ω0 Ω1
(0,0) ra ⊕ rc ra ⊕ rd
(0,1) ra ⊕ rc rb ⊕ rd
(1,0) rb ⊕ rc ra ⊕ rd
(1,1) rb ⊕ rc rb ⊕ rd
topological order, obtaining his output shares. Party1 blinds his output shares with
corresponding elements of T (again, an XOR operation is involved in each blinding),
and sends the resulting vector to Party2. Party2 unblinds each element using her
shares for output wires and obtains the OEP output S. The extended permuta-
tion in this construction includes 2N log(N) − N + 1 switches in total, requiring
2N log(N)−N + 1 OTs for their oblivious evaluation.
4.1.2 Mohassel and Sadeghian’s 2PFE scheme
Here we provide an outline of Mohassel and Sadeghian’s 2PFE construction and
refer the reader to their work for detailed information and its security proof [17].
Their protocol is as follows. Party2 first randomly generates tokens w
0
i , w
1
i  {0, 1}λ
for each owi ∈ OW corresponding to FALSE and TRUE, respectively. Party1 also
generates random blinding strings t0j , t
1
j  {0, 1}λ for each iwj ∈ IW. And then
Party1 and Party2 engage in OSN slightly modified from their 2-OEP protocol, where
at the end, Party2 learns [σ
0
j = w
0
pi−1f (j)
⊕ tbjj ] and [σ1j = w1pi−1f (j) ⊕ t
b¯j
j ]. Party2 garbles
each gate by encrypting the tokens w0c , w
1
c on its outgoing wire with the blinded
strings σ0a, σ
1
a, σ
0
b , σ
1
b on its incoming wires according to its truth table. Party2 sends
the garbled gates and her garbled input tokens to Party1. Party1 gets his garbled
input tokens using OT which can be done in an earlier stage together with other OTs
not to increase round complexity. Using the circuit mapping, his blinding strings,
the garbled gates and the garbled inputs Party1 evaluates the whole garbled circuit,
and obtains the tokens of output bits of f(x). In [17], a gate hiding mechanism is
not provided for 2PFE scheme but instead, all gates in the circuit are let to be only
a NAND gate.
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Mohassel and Sadeghian’s scheme involves oblivious evaluation of a switching
network made of 2N log(N) + 1 switches. This is composed of an additional N
switches to the ones in their EP construction. The oblivious evaluation of this
switching network requires 2N log(N) + 1 OTs [17]. All of the OTs in the protocol
can be combined for just one invocation of OT extension. The overall computation
cost2 of [17] is about 6N log(N) + 2N + 12 symmetric-key cryptographic operations.
4.2 Our Efficient 2-Party PFE Scheme
In what follows, we describe our scheme in detail (see also Figure 4.3). In the
preparation stage, Party1 compiles the function into a Boolean circuit Cf consisting
of only NAND gates3, and extract the circuit mapping pif by randomly assigning
incoming and outgoing wire indices. Both parties need to have the pre-knowledge
of template of private circuit C˜f defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.1 (Template of Private Circuit (C˜f )). A template of private circuit
C˜f is some information about a circuit Cf which consists of: (1) the number of each
party’s input bits, (2) the number of output bits, (3) the total numbers of incoming
(N) and outgoing wires (M), (4) the incoming and outgoing wire indices which
belong to the same gates, (5) the outgoing wire indices corresponding to each parties
inputs, and (6) the incoming wire indices belonging to output gates.
We continue with describing the main parts of our scheme, namely 2-OEP and
2PC garbling protocols. The steps of our complete 2-party PFE protocol is provided
below:
Party1’s Input: A bit string x1 and a function f .
Party2’s Input: A bit string x2.
2In [18], the computation cost of [17] is also computed. We note that there is a minor typo
in [18, p. 723] i.e., the computation complexity of [17] should be 12g log(2g) + 4g + 12 instead of
12 log(2g) + 4g + 12 where N = 2g and g is the number of gates.
3Any functional-complete gate can be used to rule out the need for a gate hiding mechanism as
in [17].
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Figure 4.3: Components and high level procedures of our PFE protocol. The private
function f is only known to Party1. Party1 compiles f into a Boolean circuit Cf , and
extracts the mapping pif and the template of private circuit C˜f . Party1 sends C˜f to Party2.
Party1 randomly generates the vector T . Party2 randomly generates the vector W 0. They
engage in a 2-OEP protocol where Party2 learns S
0 as the output. With the knowledge
of W 0, S0 and C˜f , Party2 garbles each gate and sends the garbled circuit to Party1. With
the knowledge of pif , C˜f , T , the garbled circuit and the garbled inputs, Party1 evaluates
the whole garbled circuit.
Output: f(x1, x2).
Preparation:
1. Party1 compiles the private function f into a Boolean circuit Cf whose the
number of input bits, output bits, and gates are n, o, and g, respectively,
extracts the mapping pif by randomly assigning incoming and outgoing wire
indices, and prepare the template of private circuit C˜f .
2. Party1 sends C˜f to Party2.
39
3. Party2 randomly generates an λ-bit token w
0
i  {0, 1}λ for FALSE on each
owi ∈ OW. This yields a total of M = n + g − o pairs. Moreover, Party2 sets
a vector W 0 := [w0i ] for i = 1, . . . ,M .
4. Party1 generates an λ-bit blinding string tj  {0, 1}λ for each iwj ∈ IW. He
sets those values to a blinding vector T := [tj] for j = 1, . . . , 2g.
2-OEP Protocol:
5. Party2 and Party1 engage in a 2-OEP protocol where Party1’s inputs are the
mapping pif and T , while Party2’s input is the vector W 0. At the end, Party2
learns the blinded string vector S0 := [σ0j = wpi−1f (j)
⊕ tj] for j = 1, . . . , N ,
while Party1 learns ⊥.
2PC Protocol (Party2 plays the garbler, and Party1 plays the evaluator):
6. Garbling: Party2 generates a secret λ-bit offset R  {0, 1}λ−11. Party2 sets
the token for TRUE on each owi as w
1
i ← w0i ⊕ R, and the blinded for TRUE
on each iwj as σ
1
j ← σ0j ⊕ R. Moreover, Party2 sets the sets W 1 := [w1i ] for
i = 1, . . . ,M and S1 := [σ1j ] for j = 1, . . . , N . With the knowledge of W
0, S0,
S1 and C˜f , Party2 garbles each odd gate using the Gb procedure in Figure 4.4,
resulting in three ciphertexts per non-output gate and two ciphertexts per
output gate. Party2 sends the garbled circuit Fˆ and the tokens Xˆ2 for her
own inputs x2 to Party1. Party1 gets tokens Xˆ1 for his own input bits x1 from
Party2 using 1-out-of-2 OTs. (If OSN construction is used, these OTs can be
jointly executed with the ones for 2-OEP protocol in parallel and with just
one invocation of extended OT. For this setting, Party2 needs to pick R and
compute the tokens for TRUE on Party1’s input wires before 2-OEP protocol.)
7. Evaluating: With the knowledge of pif , T , Fˆ and the garbled input Xˆ =
(Xˆ1, Xˆ2), Party1 evaluates the whole garbled circuit in topological order. When
an outgoing wire i is mapped to an incoming wire j, the token wi is XORed
with tj to reach the blinded string σj. Party1 evaluates each garbled gate using
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Table 4.3: Adapting half gates technique to our 2PFE for garbling an odd gate. Here,
α1, α2 and α3 define the gate type (e.g., α1 = 0, α2 = 0 and α3 = 1 for a NAND gate,
see Equation (2.2)). The token w0c on the output wire equals w
0
Gc ⊕ w0Ec ⊕ ψc. The three
ciphertexts TGc, TEc, and ψc are sent to Party1 for each gate.
Garbler half gate (pb known to
the garbler)
Evaluator half gate (pb ⊕ vb known to
the evaluator)
Defines the half gate:
fG(va, pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(α2 ⊕ pb)⊕ α3
Defines the half gate:
fE(va, vb ⊕ pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(pb ⊕ vb)
Computes:
TGc ← H(σ0a)⊕H(σ1a)⊕ (pb ⊕ α2)R
w0Gc ← H(σpaa )⊕ fG(pa, pb)R
Computes:
TEc ← H(σ0b )⊕H(σ1b )⊕ σα1a
w0Ec ← H(σpbb )
Defines the third ciphertext:
ψc := w
0
Gc ⊕ w0Ec ⊕ w0c
Party2 sends TGc, TEc, and ψc.
the Ev procedure in Figure 4.4. At the end, Party1 obtains the tokens for
f(x1, x2).
4.2.1 Use of 2-OEP protocol
Let w0i and w
1
i be the tokens for FALSE and TRUE on the ith outgoing wire owi ∈ OW,
respectively, and R be the global free-XOR offset [27] throughout the circuit. Party2
sets w0i  {0, 1}λ for each owi. The blinding string on the jth incoming wire
iwj ∈ IW is denoted as tj. Party1 sets tj  {0, 1}λ for each iwj. Party1 and Party2
engage in a 2-OEP protocol where Party1’s inputs are pif and a blinding vector for
incoming wires T := [tj] for j = 1, . . . , N , and Party2’s inputs is a token vector for
FALSE on outgoing wires W 0 := [w0i ] for i = 1, . . . ,M . At the end, Party2 learns the
vector of blinded strings for FALSE S0 := [σ0j = wpi−1f (j)
⊕ tj] for j = 1, . . . , N , while
Party1 learns ⊥.
Since our protocol allows all wires in the circuit to have the same offset R,
unlike [17], Party1 needs only a single blinding string tj for each wire, and Party2
does not need to input both tokens w0i and w
1
i to the 2-OEP protocol. This leads
to a considerable decrease in communication cost compared to [17], in which two
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blinding strings t0j and t
1
j for each wire are used, and both w
0
i and w
1
i are inputs to
the OSN protocol (slightly modified 2-OEP protocol).
4.2.2 Our 2PC Garbling Scheme for 2PFE
This section presents our garbling scheme based on half gates technique [1]. Similar
to half gates technique, Party2 sets R  {0, 1}λ−11, w1i ← w0i ⊕ R for TRUE on
each owi, and σ
1
j ← σ0j ⊕ R for TRUE on each iwj. We have lsb(R) = 1 so that
lsb(w0i ) 6= lsb(w1i ), and lsb(σ0j ) 6= lsb(σ1j ). Party2 follows the steps in Table 4.3 in
order to garble each odd gate.
We now give some necessary notation as follows. Let w0c and w
1
c denote both
tokens on an outgoing wire, while σ0a, σ
1
a, σ
0
b , σ
1
b denote the blinded strings on
incoming wires. Let also vj denote the one-bit truth value on the jth incoming
wire in a circuit. Further, wbGc and w
b
Ec denote the tokens for the garbler and the
evaluator half gate outputs for truth value b, respectively. TGc and TEc denote the
λ-bit strings needed to be sent for the garbler and evaluator half gates, respectively.
ψc denotes the additional λ-bit string needed to be sent for carrying to the specific
output token. wi and σj are the token on the ith outgoing wire and the blinded
string on the jth incoming wire obtained by Party1 while evaluating the garbled
circuit, respectively. For the jth incoming wire, let pj := lsb(σ
0
j ) be a value only
known to Party2. If two symbols are appended, we imply an AND operation, i.e.,
ab = a ∧ b. H : {0, 1}λ × Z → {0, 1}λ denotes a hash function with circular
correlation robustness for naturally derived keys, having the security parameter λ.
We use a ‘hat ’ to represent a sequence or a tuple, for instance, Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .) or
eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
In accordance with the framework4 of [2], Figure 4.4 depicts our complete gar-
bling scheme, composed of the following procedures. The garble procedure Gb takes
4Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway introduce the notion of a garbling scheme as a cryptographic
primitive. They also describe the procedures and security requirements of garbling schemes. We
refer the reader to [2,140] for details concerning definitions and introduction to the formal concepts
of garbling schemes.
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proc Gb(1λ, C˜f , S0,W 0) : proc En(eˆ, xˆ):
R {0, 1}λ−1 1 for ei ∈ eˆ do
for iwj ∈ C˜f do Xi ← ei ⊕ xiR
σ1j ← σ0j ⊕R return Xˆ
for owi ∈ Inputs(C˜f ) do
ei ← w0i
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do proc Ev(Fˆ , Xˆ, pif , T ):
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) put Fˆ in topological order using pif
if G˜i is a non-output gate then for owi ∈ Inputs(Fˆ ) and j = pif (i) do
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Gb∗NAND(σ0a, σ0b , w0i ) σj ← Xi ⊕ tj
F non−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi) for each gate G˜i {in topo. order} do
else {a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i)
(TGi , TEi , Y
0
i )← GbNAND(σ0a, σ0b ) sa ← lsb(σa); sb ← lsb(σb)
F outi ← (TGi , TEi) k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
Y 1i ← Y 0i ⊕R (TGi , TEi , ψi)← F non−outi
di ← lsb(Y 0i ) wGi ← H(σa, k)⊕ saTGi
end if if G˜i is a non-output gate then
return (Fˆ , eˆ, dˆ) wEi ← H(σb, k′)⊕ sb(TEi ⊕ σa)
wi ← wGi ⊕ wEi ⊕ ψi
private proc Gb∗NAND(σ
0
a, σ
0
b , w
0): for j = pif (i) do
pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b ) σj ← wi ⊕ tj
k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex() else
TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕H(σ1a, k)⊕ pbR (TGi , TEi)← F outi
w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG ⊕R wGi ← H(σa, k)⊕ saTGi
TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕H(σ1b , k′)⊕ σ0a wEi ← H(σb, k′)⊕ sb(TEi ⊕ σa)
w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pb(TE ⊕ σ0a) wi ← wGi ⊕ wEi
ψ ← w0G ⊕ w0E ⊕ w0 Yi ← wi
return (TG, TE, ψ) end if
return Yˆ
private proc GbNAND(σ
0
a, σ
0
b ):
pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b )
k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex() proc De(dˆ, Yˆ ):
TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕H(σ1a, k)⊕ pbR for di ∈ dˆ do
w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG ⊕R yi ← di ⊕ lsb(Yi)
TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕H(σ1b , k′)⊕ σ0a return yˆ
w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pb(TE ⊕ σ0a)
Y 0 ← w0G ⊕ w0E
return (TG, TE, Y
0)
Figure 4.4: Our complete half gate based garbling scheme for 2PFE. GbNAND and Gb
∗
NAND
are the original half gate and our modified NAND garbling procedures, respectively. A
‘hat ’ represents a sequence or a tuple, for instance, Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .) or eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
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proc De(dˆ, Yˆ ):
for di ∈ dˆ do
{modify the antepenultimate line of Gb} k ← NextIndex(); parse (h0, h1)← di
k ← NextIndex(); di ← (H(Y 0i , k), H(Y 1i , k)) if H(Yi, k) = h0 then yi ← 0
else if H(Yi, k) = h1 then yi ← 1
else return ⊥
return yˆ
Figure 4.5: Modification of our garbling scheme in Figure 4.4 for achieving authenticity
(auth) property.
1λ, C˜f , S0 and W 0 as input, and outputs (Fˆ , eˆ, dˆ) where Fˆ is the garbled version of
C˜f , eˆ is the encoding information, and dˆ is decoding information. Gb calls two private
gate garbling procedures: (1) Gb∗NAND garbles non-output NAND gates, and returns
(TG, TE, ψ), (2) GbNAND garbles output NAND gates, and returns (TG, TE, Y
0). En is
the encode algorithm that takes the plaintext input xˆ of the circuit and e as input,
and outputs a garbled input Xˆ. Ev is the evaluate procedure that takes the inputs
Fˆ , Xˆ, pif and T , and outputs garbled output Yˆ . De is the decode algorithm that
takes Yˆ and d as input, and outputs the plaintext output yˆ of the circuit. Finally, ev
is an algorithm that is not needed for garbling but used for checking the correctness
condition such that De(dˆ,Ev(Fˆ ,En(eˆ, xˆ))) = ev(f, xˆ). In Figure 4.6, we extend the
garbling model of [2, 140] to be complied with our PFE scheme.
OEP
Synt
CTH
fC
f
W
T
Gb
ˆ
fC S
e
Enx
EvX
T
F
De
Y y
d
f
f
Figure 4.6: Components of and high level procedures of a OEP based Private Function
Evaluation scheme. The topology hiding of the function f where Party1 is the evaluator
and Party2 is the garbler: (1) The private function f is only known by Party1. (2) Cf
is the Boolean circuit representation of f . (3) pif is the circuit mapping of f . (4) The
OEP protocol is mutually run where Party2 learns blinded strings. (5) The blinded strings
learnt by Party2. (6) Yao’s protocol with the blinded strings.
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We highlight that an essential difference of our garbling scheme from the half
gates technique is that the former requires an additional ciphertext ψc per gate. This
is required because of the nature of 2PFE, in which the tokens on an outgoing wire
are predetermined and specified values, while in the in half gates they are indeed a
function of the input strings. Since in our scheme the output tokens of output gates
are not predetermined, these gates can be garbled with half gates technique. Each
output gate is then garbled with two ciphertexts. Note also that Party1 gets his own
garbled inputs by means of OT. This can also be done in an earlier stage together
with other OTs in the 2-OEP protocol (if OSN construction is used) in order not
to increase round complexity. For this setting, Party2 needs to pick R and compute
the tokens for TRUE on Party1’s input wires before 2-OEP protocol. This setting is
compatible with our protocol as well.
4.3 Security of the proposed protocol
In this section, we start by revisiting the code based games of [2] and security
notions of Choi et al. [111] and Zahur et al. [1] as preliminaries. We then provide
simulation-based security proof of our proposed protocol.
4.3.1 Code based games and security notions
Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway introduce the notion of a garbling scheme as a cryp-
tographic primitive. We refer the reader to [2,140] for details concerning definitions
and a thorough introduction to the concepts of descriptive set theory.
Our work uses the prv.simS (privacy), obv.simS (obliviousness) and authS (au-
thenticity) security definitions of [2] depicted in Figure 4.7. Considering the prv.sim
and obv.sim games, the Initialize procedure randomly chooses β ← {0, 1}, then the
adversary makes a single call to the Garble procedure, and then the Finalize proce-
dure returns β
?
= β′, where β′ denotes the guess of the adversary. Regarding all
three games, the adversary is allowed to make a single call to the Garble procedure.
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prv.simG,Φ,S : obv.simG,Φ,S : authG:
Garble(f, x): Garble(f, x): Garble(f, x):
if β = 0 if β = 0 (F, e, d)←Gb(1λ, f)
(F, e, d)←Gb(1λ, f) (F, e, d)←Gb(1λ, f) X ←En(e, x)
X ←En(e, x) X ←En(e, x) return (F,X)
else (F,X, d)← S(1λ, f(x),Φ(f)) else (F,X)← S(1λ,Φ(f)) Finalize(Y ):
return (F,X, d) return (F,X) return De(d, Y ) 6∈ {⊥, f(x)}
Figure 4.7: Simulation based games for privacy, obliviousness and authenticity [2]. The
function S is a simulator, and G denotes a garbling scheme.
For further information about the simulation-based games and related security prop-
erties, we refer the reader to [2]. The advantages of the corresponding adversary
classes are as follows:
Adv
prv.sim
G,Φ,S (A, λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[prv.simAG,Φ,S(1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ (4.2)
Advobv.simG,Φ,S (A, λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[obv.simAG,Φ,S(1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
AdvauthG (A, λ) := Pr[authAG(1λ) = 1]
In order to provide the security of a scheme, in each game, the adversary must
have a negligible advantage. We also utilize the following two oracle definitions
of [1].
• CircR(x, j, b) = H(x⊕R, j)⊕ bR where R ∈ {0, 1}λ−11
• Rand(x, j, b): A random function that gives λ-bit output.
Note that the adversary is only allowed to access the oracle CircR with legal
queries 5 in order to prevent the adversary from trivially obtaining R [111]. Fur-
thermore, we give the following definition for natural queries.
5A series of queries of the form (x, j, b) is legal if the verbatim value of (x, j) is never queried
with alternating values of b [111].
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Definition 4.3.1. [1] If a series of queries of the form (x, j, b) to an oracle O
satisfies the following conditions
• we have i = q for the qth query,
• b ∈ {0, 1},
• x is naturally derived, i.e., it is obtained by one of these operations:
(a) x {0, 1}k,
(b) x← x1 ⊕ x2, where x1 and x2 are naturally derived,
(c) x← H(x1, i) where x1 is naturally derived and i ∈ Z,
(d) x← O(x1, i, b) where x1 is naturally derived,
then these queries are natural.
If for all PPT adversaries A making legal and natural queries
∣∣∣ Pr
Rand
[ARand(1λ) = 1]− Pr
R
[ACircR(1λ) = 1]
∣∣∣ < 
then H satisfies circular correlation robustness property for naturally derived keys,
where  is negligible.
4.3.2 Security Proof
Our security proof is based on the security proofs provided in [9] and [1].
Theorem 4.3.1. If the following three conditions hold
– the 2-OEP protocol securely realizes ideal 2-OEP functionality in presence of
semi-honest adversaries,
– the hash function H has circular correlation robustness for naturally derived
keys,
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proc S(1λ, C˜f , pif , T , yˆ) : private proc Sim∗NAND(σ0a, σ0b , w0): //
 SimNAND(σ0a, σ0b ):
for owi ∈ OW ˜(Cf ) do pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b )
w0i  {0, 1}λ k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
for iwj ∈ IW ˜(Cf ) do TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕Rand(σ0a, k, pb)
σ0j ← wpi−1f (j) ⊕ tj w
0
G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG
for owi ∈ Inputs ˜(Cf ) do TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕Rand(σ0b , k′, 0)⊕ σ0a
Xi ← w0i w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pa(TE ⊕ σ0a)
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do ψ ← w0G ⊕ w0E ⊕ w0 //
 Y 0 ← w0G ⊕ w0E
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) return (TG, TE, ψ) //
 (TG, TE, Y 0)
if G˜i is a non-output gate then
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Sim∗NAND(σ0a, σ0b , w0i )
F non−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi)
else
(TGi , TEi , Y
0
i )← SimNAND(σ0a, σ0b )
F outi ← (TGi , TEi)
di ← lsb(Y 0i )⊕ yi
end if
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
proc GO1 (1λ, C˜f , pif , T , xˆ): // GCircR2 private proc Sim∗ONAND1(σvaa , σvbb , wvii , va, vb):
vˆ ← evalWires(C˜f , pif , xˆ) //



SimONAND1(σvaa , σvbb , va, vb):
for owi ∈ OW ˜(Cf ) do sa ← lsb(σvaa ); sb ← lsb(σvbb )
wvii  {0, 1}λ// wv¯ii ← wvii ⊕R k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
for iwj ∈ IW ˜(Cf ) do TG ← H(σvaa , k)⊕O(σvaa , k, vb ⊕ sb)
B := vpi−1f (j) , σ
B
j ← wBpi−1f (j) ⊕ tj w
va(vb⊕sb)
G ← H(σvaa , k)⊕ saTG
for owi ∈ Inputs ˜(Cf ) do TE ← H(σvbb , k′)⊕O(σvbb , k′, va)⊕ σvaa
Xi ← wvii wvasbE ← H(σvbb , k′)⊕ sb(TE ⊕ σvaa )
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do ψ ← wva(vb⊕sb)G ⊕ wvasbE ⊕ wvii
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) //



Y ← wva(vb⊕sb)G ⊕ wvasbE
if G˜i is a non-output gate then return (TG, TE, ψ) //
 (TG, TE, Y )
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Sim∗ONAND1(σvaa , σvbb , wvii , va, vb)
F non−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi)
else private proc evalWires(C˜f , pif , xˆ):
(TGi , TEi , Y
vi
i )← SimONAND1(σvaa , σvbb , va, vb) for iwj ∈ C˜f do vi ← xi
F outi ← (TGi , TEi) for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do
Y v¯ii ← Y vii ⊕R {a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i)
di ← lsb(Y vii )⊕ vi vi ← NAND(va, vb)
end if return vˆ
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
Figure 4.8: Part-A. The simulator for prv.simS security, and the hybrids used in the proof.
We obtain G2 by adding the statements within sharp corner boxes to G1. The use of the
statements within rounded-corner boxes alters the procedures from garbling of non-output
gate to garbling of output gate. A ‘hat ’ represents a sequence or a tuple, for instance,
Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .) or eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
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proc G3(1λ, C˜f , pif , T , xˆ): private proc Sim∗NAND3(σ0a, σ0b , w0):
R {0, 1}λ−1 1 //
 SimNAND3(σ0a, σ0b ):
for owi ∈ OW ˜(Cf ) do pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b )
w0i  {0, 1}λ, w1i ← w0i ⊕R k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
for iwj ∈ IW ˜(Cf ) do TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕H(σ1a, k)⊕ pbR
σ0j ← wpi−1f (j) ⊕ tj , σ
1
j ← σ0j ⊕R w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG ⊕R
for owi ∈ Inputs ˜(Cf ) do TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕H(σ1b , k′)⊕ σ0a
Xi ← wxii w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pb(TE ⊕ σ0a)
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do ψ ← w0G ⊕ w0E ⊕ w0
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) //
 Y 0 ← w0G ⊕ w0E
if G˜i is a non-output gate then return (TG, TE, ψ) //
 (TG, TE, Y 0)
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Sim∗NAND3(σ0a, σ0b , w0i )
F non−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi)
else
(TGi , TEi , Y
0
i )← SimNAND3(σ0a, σ0b )
F outi ← (TGi , TEi)
Y 1i ← Y 0i ⊕R , di ← lsb(Y 0i )
end if
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
Figure 4.9: Part-B. The simulator for prv.simS security, and the hybrids used in the proof.
A ‘hat ’ represents a sequence or a tuple, for instance, Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .) or eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
(Please see Figure 4.8 for the beginning of the figure.)
– the OT scheme for acquisition of Party1’s garbled input by Party2 securely real-
izes FOT functionality in the OT-hybrid model against semi-honest adversaries,
then our scheme is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. We prove the security of our scheme against the corruption of either party,
separately. First, consider the case that Party1 is corrupted. Since the ideal 2-OEP
functionality outputs ⊥ for Party1, and the transcripts received by Party1 during OT
reveals nothing other than Party1’s garbled input due to the ideal execution FOT in
the OT-hybrid model, we only need to prove that the 2PC phase does not give any
private information about Party2’s input to Party1. For any probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A1, controlling Party1 in the real world, we construct a simulation
game based on prv.sim game from [2] as follows. The simulation involves Initialize,
Garble, and Finalize procedures. The Initialize procedure picks a value β ← {0, 1}
randomly. Then, A1 makes a single call to the Garble procedure (see prv.sim game
of Figure 4.7). Note that S denotes the simulation function, and Gb denotes the
49
actual garbling (Figure 4.8 and 4.9 show the procedures for S). We highlight that
in our simulation, the side-information Φ(f) is replaced by (C˜f , pif , T ) since they
are already known to Party1. Finally, in the Finalize(β
′) procedure, A1 tries to make
a guess β′ for the value of β, and the procedure outputs β ?= β′. We now prove that
the simulation function output (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ) is computationally indistinguishable from
(F,X, d) by using the chain of hybrids as follows (see also Figure 4.8 and 4.8).
1. S =c GRand1 : Since both generated (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ) outputs include uniformly random
values for components, their distributions are identical. More concretely, since
the truth values of wires vi’s are used only as a superscript for the tokens W
vi
by G1, these W vii ’s could have been named W 0i for all i values.
2. GRand1 =c GCircR1 : Only the oracle O changed from Rand to CircR. Due to our
assumption about the hash function, these two hybrids are computationally
indistinguishable.
3. GCircR1 =c GCircR2 : G2 is obtained by the addition of the statements within sharp
corner boxes to G1 in Figure 4.8. Here, the variable R in G2 refers to the R
of the oracle CircR. The only difference between the two hybrids is that some
extra values that are not used computed by G2 (those extra values will be used
in G3).
4. GCircR2 =c G3: G3 does not need to compute vi for non-input wires and to
randomly sample W vii , instead, it randomly samples W
0
i . Next, it sets W
1
i ←
W 0i ⊕R instead of setting W v¯ii ← W vii ⊕R. The algebraic relationships among
variables remain unchanged. The oracle calls are also expanded in SimAnd3 to
correspond to O = CircR.
Note that G3 computes (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ) as (Fˆ , eˆ, dˆ)← Gb(1λ, f); Xˆ ← En(eˆ, xˆ), which is
exactly how these values are computed in the real interaction in the prv.simS game.
Therefore, the advantage of A1 in the prv.sim game
Adv
prv.sim
G,S (A, λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[prv.simAG,S(λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
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{replace the last three lines of S
with the following ones:}
k ← NextIndex(); r  {0, 1}λ
if yi = 0
then di ← (H(Y 0i , k), r)
else di ← (r,H(Y 0i , k))
end if
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
Figure 4.10: The required modifications on Figure 4.8 in order to show auth property.
is negligible. Hence, our scheme satisfies the security notion of prv.simS and obv.simS
6.
This proves that our scheme is secure against the corrupted Party1.
Second, consider the case that Party2 is corrupted. For any probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A2, controlling Party2 during our protocol in the real world, we con-
struct a simulator S ′ that simulates A2’s view in the ideal world. S ′ runs A2 on
Party2’s input, and C˜f as follows.
1. S ′ asks A2 to generate Wˆ 0 := [wˆ0i  {0, 1}λ] for each owi ∈ OW and receives
Wˆ 0.
2. S ′ then picks tˆj  {0, 1}λ for j = 1, . . . , N , and computes Sˆ0 = [σˆj ←
wˆ0
pi−1f (j)
⊕ tˆj] and gives Sˆ0 to A2.
In the real execution of our protocol, Party2 receives only the message S
0 in
Round 2 (apart from the exchanged messages during the OT protocol for Party1’s
garbled input). However, the transcripts received by Party2 during OT do not leak
any information to Party2 because of FOT in the OT-hybrid model. Due to one-
time pad security, in Party2’s view, the distributions of Sˆ
0 and S0 are identical (i.e.,
USˆ0 ≈c US0). This concludes the security proof of our scheme.
6The proof for obv.simS differs from that of prv.simS only in that in obv.simS , the simulator
neither computes dˆ, nor receives yˆ. So providing proof for prv.simS also implies proof for obc.simS .
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In order to achieve the authenticity property (i.e., auth), it is required to show
that the probability of an adversary finding a set Yˆ ′ 6= Ev(Fˆ , Xˆ) such that De(dˆ, Yˆ ′) 6=
⊥ is negligible. In accordance with [1], our garbling scheme in Figure 4.4 can be mod-
ified as in Figure 4.5 to achieve authenticity property (i.e., the antepenultimate line
of Gb in Figure 4.4 can be modified as k ← NextIndex(); di ← (H(Y 0i , k), H(Y 1i , k)),
and De(dˆ, Yˆ ) procedure in Figure 4.4 can be modified as De(dˆ, Yˆ ) procedure in
Figure 4.5).
Theorem 4.3.2. Our modified scheme (see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5) satisfies
the security notion of auth with any H that has correlation robustness for naturally
derived keys.
Proof Sketch. We execute the simulator S (in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 with the modifica-
tions in Figure 4.10), and obtain (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ). Then, we hand (Fˆ , Xˆ) to the adversary,
and receive Yˆ ′ from the adversary. After that, we run the decoding procedure (see
procedure De in Figure 4.5) on dˆ and the output of adversary Yˆ ′. If the result is
De(dˆ, Yˆ ′) = ⊥, then the adversary fails, otherwise, it succeeds. The adversary can
win the game by guessing a correct value r with probability at most 1/2λ where λ is
the security parameter. The rest of the proof utilizes the same sequence of hybrids
in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
4.4 Performance Comparison
One of the primary objectives of the recent research on PFE is minimizing the
communication cost. This is due to the fact that historical developments in hardware
technology show us computing power advances faster than communication channels.
This is even more likely to be so in the near future, i.e., the main bottleneck for many
secure computation applications will not be the CPU load but be the bandwidth
constraints [28,108]. Therefore we are first interested in the problem of minimizing
the communication complexity.
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Table 4.4: Analysis of communication costs for 2PFE schemes (see Section 4.1.1 for details
of transfers in the OSN phases).
MS’13 [17] Our Protocol
Num. of Strings Str. Length (bits) Num. of Strings Str. Length (bits)
OSN
Before OT Ext. Party2 → Party1 N 2λ N λ
During OT Ext.
Party1 → Party2 λ 2N log(N) + 1 λ 2N log(N)−N + 1
Party2 → Party1 4N log(N)−N + 2 2λ 4N log(N)− 2N + 2 λ
After OT Ext. Party1 → Party2 N 2λ N λ
2PC Garbled Circ. Party2 → Party1 2N λ 1.5N λ
TOTAL (bits) (10N log(N) + 4N + 5)λ (6N log(N) + 0.5N + 3)λ
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our protocol and compare it with
Mohassel and Sadeghian’s 2-party PFE scheme [17]. Without loss of generality, in
order for a fair comparison, we assume that the 2-OEP protocol of our scheme is
also realized by the OSN construction in [17], and that the OSN phases in both
protocols are optimized with the General OT extension scheme of Asharov, Lindell,
Schneider, and Zohner [77]. Similar results can be obtained by using other Ishai et
al. based OT extension schemes [75,76] as well.
Regarding the OSN phase, the total number of OTs in our 2PFE protocol is
2N log(N)−N + 1, while it is 2N log(N) + 1 in [17] (see Section 4.1.1). Moreover,
our protocol requires only one of the tokens on a wire entering the OSN phase, so the
size of the rows in Table 4.2 which enter each OT is reduced by a factor of two [17],
further resulting in a significant decrease in communication cost. Regarding the 2PC
phase, our scheme garbles each non-output gate with three ciphertexts, and each
output gate with two ciphertexts. This yields more than 25% reduction compared
to the same phase in the scheme in [17].
Table 4.4 shows the number of strings and their corresponding lengths sent in
each turn in both schemes (see also Section 4.1.1 for details of transfers in the OSN
phases). We omit the OTs for Party1’s garbled input, the transfers for decoding the
garbled output, and the base OTs in the OT extension scheme [77]. The strings sent
by Party2 during the OT extension in [17], in fact, consists of 4N log(N) − 2N + 2
of λ-bit stings and 2N λ-bit strings. The data sent by Party2 before OT extension
can also be sent during Party2’s turn in OT extension for saving in the number of
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Table 4.5: Communication cost comparison of 2PFE schemes in terms of λ-bits.
Num. of MS’13 [17] Our Protocol Overall
Gates OSN Phase 2PC Phase Total OSN Phase 2PC Phase Total Reduction
28 47,109 1,024 48,133 27,139 768 27,907 42.0%
210 229,381 4,096 233,477 133,123 3,072 136,195 41.7%
212 1,081,349 16,384 1,097,733 630,787 12,288 643,075 41.4%
214 4,980,741 65,536 5,046,277 2,916,355 49,152 2,965,507 41.2%
216 22,544,389 262,144 22,806,533 13,238,275 196,608 13,434,883 41.1%
218 100,663,301 1,048,576 101,711,877 59,244,547 786,432 60,030,979 41.0%
220 444,596,229 4,194,304 448,790,533 262,144,003 3,145,728 265,289,731 40.9%
rounds. Table 4.5 reflects the communication cost reduction achieved by our 2PFE
protocol for the circuits with different number of gates.
Recently, in [30], Wang and Malluhi have attempted to improve the 2PFE scheme
in [17] by removing only one ciphertext from each garbled gate (in 2PC phase) while
retaining the cost of OSN phase unchanged. However, the influence of 2PC phase
in [17] on overall communication cost is quite low (see Table 4.5). Reducing the
bandwidth use in the 2PC phase by 25% only results in less than 1% reduction
in the total cost. For instance, given a circuit with 1024 gates, their optimization
reduces the communication cost of the 2PC phase from 4,096 λ-bit strings to 3,072
of them, while the OSN phase cost remains 229,38 λ-bits. Therefore, the overall
gain from their optimization for this setting is ∼0.4%.
Considering the computational complexity, although both schemes asymptoti-
cally require O(N log(N)) operations, our scheme achieves a linear time improve-
ment over [17]. More precisely, in the OSN phase, our scheme eliminates N oblivious
transfer (OT) operations. This results in a decrease of 2N symmetric encryptions
performed by Party2 (Party1’s computation cost remains the same in this phase).
Regarding the 2PC phase, our scheme requires one additional operation per gate
(during the Ev procedure). This yields additional 0.5N symmetric operations to be
performed by Party1 (Party2’s computation cost remains the same in this phase).
Therefore, our scheme reduces the overall computation cost by 1.5N symmetric op-
erations. The round complexity of our scheme does not differ from the 2PFE scheme
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in [17]. Namely, both protocols consist of a constant-round OT extension scheme
in OSN phase, and our 2PC phase consists of the same number of rounds as in the
garbling scheme used in [17].
55
Chapter 5
HIGHLY EFFICIENT AND
REUSABLE PRIVATE
FUNCTION EVALUATION
WITH LINEAR COMPLEXITY
In this chapter, we propose a novel and highly efficient two-party private function
evaluation (2PFE) scheme for Boolean circuits based on the DDH assumption. Our
scheme enjoys the cost reduction due to the reusability of tokens that will be used in
the 2PC stage. This eliminates some of the computations and exchanged messages
in the subsequent executions for the same function and remarkably reduces the cost
for the cases the same function is evaluated more than once.
In Section 5.1, we give a preliminary background that is used throughout this
chapter. Section 5.2 presents the descriptions of our InExe and ReExe protocols,
and a method for the case where Party1 would like to execute 2PFE with various
Party2s separately. Section 5.3 provides the complexities of our resulting protocols,
and compare them with the existing state-of-the-art 2PFE protocols. In Section 5.4,
we formally prove the security of our protocols in the semi-honest model.
5.1 Preliminaries
This section provides some background information on the DDH assumption and
the state-of-the-art generic 2PFE framework.
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5.1.1 Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption for G provides that the following
two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
{(P1, P2, a · P1, a · P2) : Pi ∈ G, a ∈R Z∗q} ≈c
{(P1, P2, a1 · P1, a2 · P2) : Pi ∈ G, a1, a2 ∈R Z∗q}.
where X ≈c Y denotes that the sets X and Y are computationally indistinguish-
able. The security of our protocols is based on the following lemma of Naor and
Reingold [141] providing a natural generalization of the DDH assumption for m > 2
generators.
Lemma 5.1.1 ( [141]). Under the DDH assumption on G, for any positive integer
m,
{(P1, . . . , Pm, a · P1, . . . , a · Pm) : Pi ∈ G, a ∈R Z∗q} ≈c
{(P1, . . . , Pm, a1 · P1, . . . , am · Pm) : Pi ∈ G, a1, . . . , am ∈R Z∗q}.
There exist certain elliptic curve groups where the DDH assumption holds. We
refer the reader to [142, 143]. The main advantage of the elliptic curve DDH as-
sumption over the discrete logarithm based DDH assumption is that the discrete
logarithm DDH problem requires sub-exponential time [144] while the current best
algorithms known for solving the elliptic curve DDH problem requires exponential
time resulting in the same security with smaller key sizes. Therefore, in general,
the elliptic curve based systems are more practical than the classical discrete loga-
rithm systems since smaller parameters may be chosen to ensure the same level of
security. For example, for the 112-bit symmetric key security level, a 2048-bit large
prime number is required for a discrete logarithm group, whereas only a 224-bit
prime p is sufficient for a NIST-elliptic curve over Fp [145].
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5.1.2 Notations and Concept of 2PFE Framework
In a two-party private function evaluation (2PFE) scheme, Party1 has a function
input f (compiled into a boolean circuit Cf ) and optionally a private input bit
string x1, whereas Party2 has an input bit string x2. The parties aim to evaluate
f on x1 and x2 so that at least one of them would obtain the resulting f(x1, x2).
The recent 2PFE schemes [9,17] conform to a generic 2PFE framework (formalized
by [17]) that basically reduces the 2PFE problem to hiding both parties’ input
strings and topology of the circuit. The framework is not concerned with hiding the
gates since it allows only one type of gate in the circuit structure.
In a nutshell, the 2PFE framework is as follows. Before starting the 2PFE
protocol, Party1 compiles the function into a boolean circuit Cf consisting of only
one type of gates (e.g., NAND gates). During the protocol execution, Party1 and
Party2 first engage in a mapping evaluation protocol where Party2 obliviously obtains
the tokens on gate inputs, and then they mutually run a 2PC protocol where Party2
garbles each gate separately using those tokens, and Party1 evaluates the garbled
circuit. As a result, Party1 obtains the garbled tokens that map to the corresponding
outputs of the function (i.e., y = f(x1, x2)).
Let g, n, and m denote the number of gates (circuit size), the number of inputs,
and the number of outputs of Cf , respectively. Let OW = (ow1, . . . , own+g−m) denote
the set of outgoing wires that is the union of the input wires of the circuit and the
output wires of its non-output gates. Note that the total number of elements in OW
is M = n + g − m. Similarly, let IW = (iw1, . . . , iw2g) denote the set of incoming
wires that is the union of the input wires of each gate in the circuit. Note also that
the total number of elements in IW is N = 2g. Throughout this paper, M and
N denote the numbers of outgoing and incoming wires, respectively. Let pif be a
mapping such that j ← pif (i) if and only if owi ∈ OW and iwj ∈ IW correspond to
the same wire in the circuit Cf .
We define the public information of the circuit Cf as PubInfoCf which is com-
posed of: (1) the number of each party’s input bits, (2) the number of output bits,
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(3) the total number of incoming wires N and that of outgoing wires M , (4) the
incoming and outgoing/output wire indices that belong to each gate, (5) the outgo-
ing wire indices corresponding to each party’s input bits. Note that, it is a common
assumption among PFE schemes [9, 17, 20] that both parties have pre-agreement
on the number of gates (g), the number of input wires (n), the number of output
wires (m), the number of input bits of Party1 (q). Both parties generate PubInfoCf
at the beginning of the protocol execution (without an additional round of commu-
nication). Namely, each party runs the following deterministic procedure to obtain
PubInfoCf on public input (g, n,m, q):
• Set N := 2g, M := n+ g −m.
• For i = 1, . . . , g, set iw2i−1 and iw2i as the incoming wires of the gate Gi.
• For i = 1, . . . , g −m, set owi as the outgoing wire of the gate Gi.
• For i = 1, . . . , q, set owg−m+i as the outgoing wire corresponding to Party1’s
i-th input bit.
• For i = 1, . . . , n − q, set owg−m+q+i as the outgoing wire corresponding to
Party2’s i-th input bit.
• For i = 1, . . . ,m, set the output wire yi as the output of Gg−m+i.
• Return PubInfoCf := (M,N,OW, IW, y).
Next, Party1 generates pif (i.e., the connection between incoming and outgoing
wire indices) using the following randomized procedure on input (Cf ,OW, IW).
• Randomly permute the indices 1, . . . , g−m, and assign it to an ordered set A.
• For i = 1, . . . , g − m, assign GA[i] to the i-th non-output gate in topological
order.
• For i = 1, . . . ,m, assign Gg−m+i to i-th output gate.
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• Extract pif from Cf according to the connections between ows and iws.
• Return pif .
We next define as Reusable Mapping Template in which the efficiency of our
scheme mostly due to the reusability of this template.1
Definition 5.1.1 (Reusable Mapping Template). Let pi−1f (j) be the inverse mapping
of pif that denotes the index of the outgoing wire connected to iwj. A Reusable
Mapping Template is a set ReuseTempf := (P ,Q) such that P := (P1, . . . , PM)
where Pi is a generator of the group picked for owi by Party2 and Q := (Q1, . . . , QN)
where Qj := tj · Ppi−1f (j) is a group element generated for iwj by Party1 for tj ∈R Z
∗
q,
i = 1, . . . ,M , and j = 1, . . . , N .
5.2 Our PFE Scheme
In this section, we first present our protocol for initial executions InExe which is
optimized by oﬄine/online decomposition (Figure 5.1). We next introduce our ef-
ficient resumption protocol for subsequent executions ReExe (Figure 5.3). We then
propose an efficient method for executions with multiple Party2s.
5.2.1 The description of our InExe protocol
We now introduce our efficient InExe scheme that is optimized by carrying out some
of the computations in the off-line stage. In general, such precomputation tech-
niques enhance real-time performance at the cost of extra preliminary computations
and storage consumption. Besides, in today’s technological perspectives, memory
consumption is rarely considered to be a serious drawback since storage units are
abundant in many recent devices. We give the full protocol steps of our optimized
initial execution InExe protocol with a precomputation phase in Figure 5.2. Also,
1Although KM11 [9] also involves homomorphic encryption for token generation, it requires all
protocol steps to be repeated in each subsequent executions.
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Party1 Party2
input: x1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, Cf , pif Pre-shared info: input: x2 ∈ {0, 1}∗
G, q, P,PubInfoCf
Offline
Pre-computation
Pick: α0, α1 ∈R Z∗q.
Generate: P := (P1, . . . , PM),
W0 := (W 0i  α0 · Pi),
W1 := (W 1i  α1 · Pi), i = 1, . . . ,M .
P←−−−−−−−
Generate: T := (t1, . . . , tN : tj ∈R Z∗q),
Q = (Qj ← tj · Ppi−1f (j)), j = 1, . . . , N.
Keep: ReuseTempf := (P ,Q).
Q−−−−−−−→
Generate: V0 := (V 0j  α0 ·Qj),
V1 := (V 1j  α1 ·Qj), j = 1, . . . , N.
Keep: ReuseTempf := (P ,Q).
Pick: Y 0 := (y0i R {0, 1}`),
Y 1 := (y1i R {0, 1}`), i = 1, . . . ,m.
Run 2PC Protocol
Act as Evaluator Act as Garbler
F,X2←−−−−−−
Generate garbled circ. F by using
(W0,W1,V0,V1, Y 0, Y 1,PubInfoCf ).
Using F,X1, X2, T, pif
obtain Y = f (x1, x2).
Figure 5.1: Sketch of our InExe 2PFE Protocol. ReuseTempf and T are stored (if needed)
for the later PFE runs by ReExe protocol. Note that in case Party1 has inputs (x1) then
OT protocol is required (to send the corresponding garbled X1) which can be trivially
combined with the protocol rounds for minimization of the total number of rounds.
Figure 5.1 depicts the protocol steps of our InExe protocol. The computations that
can be carried out in the precomputation phase include the generation of P , and
the computation of the sets W0 and W1 by Party2.
In accordance with the generic 2PFE framework, the description of our InExe is
as follows.
Inputs: Prior to the protocol execution, both parties should have a pre-agreement
on a cyclic group G of large prime order q ∈ O(λ) with a generator P and the
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Our InExe Protocol: The procedures for the initial execution
Party1’s Input: x1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, a Boolean circuit Cf consisting of NAND gates
(compiled from the function f) and a mapping pif (extracted from Cf ).
Party2’s Input: x2 ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Pre-shared Information: A group G of prime order q with a generator P and
PubInfoCf .
Output: f(x1, x2).
Precomputation phase
1. Party2 generates the set P of M random generators. It also picks α0, α1 ∈R
Z∗q, and prepares the group element setsW0 := (W 01 , . . . ,W 0M : W 0i  α0·Pi, i =
1, . . . ,M) for FALSEs andW1 := (W 11 , . . . ,W 1M : W 1i  α1 ·Pi, i = 1, . . . ,M) for
TRUEs, where Pi is the i-th element in P and each W bi is a token for owi ∈ OW,
b ∈ {0, 1}. Party2 stores P , W0, W1, α0, and α1.
Online phase
Round 1:
2. Party2 sends P to Party1.
Round 2:
3. Party1 generates the blinding set T := (t1, . . . , tN : tj ∈R Z∗q, j = 1, . . . , N),
computes the set Q = (Q1, . . . , QN : Qj ← tj · Ppi−1f (j), j = 1, . . . , N).
For the later PFE runs with the same function (if needed), Party1 stores
ReuseTempf := (P1, . . . , PM , Q1, . . . , QN) (see Figure 5.4 for the protocol of
subsequent executions (ReExe)). Party1 sends Q to Party2.
Round 3:
4. Party2 prepares the group element sets V0 := (V 01 , . . . , V 0N : V 0j  α0 ·Qj, j =
1, . . . , N) for FALSEs and V1 := (V 11 , . . . , V 1N : V 1j  α1 · Qj, j = 1, . . . , N) for
TRUEs for iwj ∈ IW. For the later PFE runs with the same function (if needed),
Party2 stores ReuseTempf = (P1, . . . , PM , Q1, . . . , QN). Next, Party2 picks two
random token sets for the output wires Y 0 := (y01, . . . , y
0
m : y
0
i R {0, 1}`, i =
1, . . . ,m) and Y 1 := (y11, . . . , y
1
m : y
1
i R {0, 1}`, i = 1, . . . ,m).
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5. The 2PC protocol now starts from this stage where Party2 becomes the
garbler and Party1 becomes the evaluator. Using W0, W1, V0, V1, Y 0,
Y 1, and PubInfoCf , Party2 prepares the garbled circuit F by garbling each
gate as follows. Party2 prepares the following four ciphertexts to garble a
non-output NAND gate Ga whose incoming wires iwi and iwj, and outgo-
ing wire is owz: EncV 0i ,V 0j (W
1
z ), EncV 0i ,V 1j (W
1
z ), EncV 1i ,V 0j (W
1
z ), EncV 1i ,V 1j (W
0
z ).
Similarly, Party2 prepares the following four ciphertexts to garble an output
NAND gate Gb whose incoming wires iwi and iwj, and output wire index is z:
EncV 0i ,V 0j (y
1
z), EncV 0i ,V 1j (y
1
z), EncV 1i ,V 0j (y
1
z), EncV 1i ,V 1j (y
0
z). Each garbled gate GGa
is then composed of four `-bit ciphertexts and two log2(τ)-bit indices, I
1
a and
I2a (see Section 5.2.1 for garbling details). Party2 sends F and the garbled input
X2 for its own input x2 to Party1. Party1 also obtains the garbled input X1 for
its own input x1 from Party2 using parallel 1-out-of-2 OTs (or a more efficient
OT extension scheme).a
6. Using F , the garbled input X = (X1, X2), T , and pif , Party1 evaluates the
whole garbled circuit in topological order. If an outgoing wire owd is mapped
to an incoming wire iwe, then the group element Ve of the e-th incoming wire is
computed by the multiplication of the group element Wd of the d-th outgoing
wire with the blinding value te (i.e., if pif (d) = e, then Ve = te · Wd). Each
garbled gate GGa can be evaluated whenever both group elements (Vi, Vj) on
its incoming wires (iwi, iwj) are computed. To evaluate each GGa, Party1 first
computes H(Vi, Vj, gateID), and then XORs the ciphertext in the GGa pointed
by I1a -th and I
2
a -th bits of [H(Vi, Vj, gateID)]τ . In the end, Party1 obtains the
token set Y = (y1, . . . , ym) for the output bits f(x1, x2).
aNote that the OT protocol rounds can be combined with the former protocol rounds for
minimization of the overall rounds.
Figure 5.2: Our Optimized InExe 2PFE Protocol via decomposition of oﬄine/online com-
putations
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PubInfoCf on inputs (g, n,m, q). Each party has the following inputs: (1) Party1
holds a boolean circuit Cf consisting of only one type of gates (e.g., NAND gates)
and the corresponding mapping pif , and (possibly but not necessarily) his input x1
(2) Party2 holds his inputs x2.
Oﬄine pre-computation phase: Party2 generates the set P of M random gen-
erators. It also picks α0, α1 ∈R Z∗q, and prepares the group element sets W0 :=
(W 01 , . . . ,W
0
M : W
0
i  α0 · Pi, i = 1, . . . ,M) for FALSEs and W1 := (W 11 , . . . ,W 1M :
W 1i  α1 ·Pi, i = 1, . . . ,M) for TRUEs, where Pi is the i-th element in P and each
W bi is a token for owi ∈ OW, b ∈ {0, 1}. Party2 stores P , W0, W1, α0, and α1.
Online phase: Online phase consists of three rounds as follows.
Round 1: Party2 sends P to Party1.
Round 2: Party1 generates the blinding set T := (t1, . . . , tN : tj ∈R Z∗q, j =
1, . . . , N), computes the set Q = (Q1, . . . , QN : Qj ← tj · Ppi−1f (j), j = 1, . . . , N),
where pi−1f (j) denotes the index of the outgoing wire connected to iwj. Party1 sends
Q to Party2. Now, both parties have the knowledge of the set ReuseTempf := (P ,Q).
For the later PFE runs with the same function (if needed), Party1 stores ReuseTempf
(see Figure 5.4 for the protocol of subsequent executions (ReExe)).
Party2 prepares the group element sets corresponding to iwj ∈ IW. The set V0 is
for FALSE, V1 is for TRUE semantic values.
V0 := (V 01 , . . . , V 0N : V 0j  α0 ·Qj, j = 1, . . . , N),
V1 := (V 11 , . . . , V 1N : V 1j  α1 ·Qj, j = 1, . . . , N).
Next, Party2 picks the following two randomly chosen ordered sets for output wires
of the circuit
Y 0 := (y01, . . . , y
0
m : y
0
i R {0, 1}`, i = 1, . . . ,m),
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Y 1 := (y11, . . . , y
1
m : y
1
i R {0, 1}`, i = 1, . . . ,m),
where ` is the bit length of a group element (i.e., ` = dlog2(q)e). For the later PFE
runs with the same function (if needed), Party2 stores ReuseTempf .
Round 3: Now, both parties then engage in a 2PC protocol where Party2 and Party1
play the garbler and evaluator roles, respectively. Party2 garbles the whole circuit
by using W0, W1, V0, V1, Y 0, Y 1, and PubInfoCf . Note that in contrast to the
usual garbling in [9,17], in our garbling phase, Party2 has group elements instead of
random tokens. To use group elements as keys, we now define an instantiation of a
dual-key cipher (DKC) notion of [2] using a pseudorandom function as
EncP1,P2(m) := [H(P1, P2, gateID)]` ⊕m
where P1 and P2 are two group elements used as keys, m is the `-bit plaintext, gateID
is the index number of the gate, H : G×G× {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`+τ is a hash-function
(which we model as a random oracle), τ is an integer such that τ > 2 log2(4g) for
preventing collisions in the τ rightmost bits of hashes, and [H(X)]` denotes the
truncated hash value (of the message X) which is cropped to the ` leftmost bits of
H(X) for some X. Also, we denote [H(X)]τ for the truncated hash value (of the
message X) which is cropped to the τ rightmost bits of H(X) for some X. The
former truncated hash value is used for encryption, while the latter is utilized for
the point and permute optimization of Beaver et al. [29]. Note that the encryption
scheme Enc is based on the encryption scheme in [146] and differs from it only by
the utilization of group elements as keys.
Let Ga be a non-output NAND gate for some a ∈ {1, . . . , g}. Let also iwi, iwj be
the incoming wires and owz be the outgoing wire of Ga where i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and
z ∈ {1, . . . , N}. To garble Ga, Party2 prepares the following four ciphertexts
ct1a := EncV 0i ,V 0j (W
1
z ), ct
2
a := EncV 0i ,V 1j (W
1
z ),
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ct3a := EncV 1i ,V 0j (W
1
z ), ct
4
a := EncV 1i ,V 1j (W
0
z )
where W 1z and W
1
z are the `-bit string representations of the group elements. Sim-
ilarly, let Gb be an output NAND gate for some b ∈ {1, . . . , g}. Let also iwi, iwj be
the incoming wires and z be the output wire index of Gb where i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
and z ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. To garble Gb, Party2 prepares the following four ciphertexts
ct1b := EncV 0i ,V 0j (y
1
z), ct
2
b := EncV 0i ,V 1j (y
1
z),
ct3b := EncV 1i ,V 0j (y
1
z), ct
4
b := EncV 1i ,V 1j (y
0
z).
For the point and permute optimization [29], for each gate Ga in the circuit,
Party2 picks random indices I
1
a , I
2
a ∈ {1, . . . , τ} such that
{(X[I1a ],X[I2a ]), (Y[I1a ],Y[I2a ]), (Z[I1a ],Z[I2a ]), (T[I1a ],T[I2a ])} =
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
where X = [H(V 0i , V
0
j , gateID)]τ , Y = [H(V
0
i , V
1
j , gateID)]τ , Z = [H(V
1
i , V
0
j , gateID)]τ ,
T = [H(V 1i , V
1
j , gateID)]τ , and S[I
i
a] denotes the I
i
a-th bit of the bit string S. We
denote each garbled gate GGa, which is then composed of four `-bit ciphertexts, ct
1
a,
ct2a, ct
3
a, and ct
4
a, and an index pair (I
1
a , I
2
a). Note that the set of ciphertexts in the
GGa are ordered according to I
1
a -th and I
2
a -th bits of their corresponding X, Y, Z, and
T values. For example, let X = 011001 . . . 1, Y = 101111 . . . 0, Z = 110001 . . . 0, and
T = 010111 . . . 1. If (I1a , I
2
a) = (1, 5) then (X[1],X[5]) = (0, 0), (Y[1],Y[5]) = (1, 1),
(Z[1],Z[5]) = (1, 0), (T[1],T[5]) = (0, 1), and therefore, we have GGa = (ct
1
a, ct
4
a,
ct3a, ct
2
a, (I
1
a , I
2
a)). A trivial method for finding such a pair (I
1
a , I
2
a) could be as fol-
lows. First, Party2 can find I
1
a such that {X[I1a ],Y[I1a ],Z[I1a ],T[I1a ]} = {0, 0, 1, 1} with
probability of 6/16 in each trial. Then, I2a could also be found with a probability
of 4/16 in each trial. Therefore, the expected number of trials to find a pair of
(I1a , I
2
a) is 7. Party2 garbles all the gates of the circuit in the above-mentioned way,
and obtains the garbled circuit F . Party2 then sends F and its garbled input X2
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(i.e., the Wi group elements for outgoing wires corresponding to x2) to Party1. As
usual, Party1 gets its own garbled input X1 (i.e., the Wi group elements for outgoing
wires corresponding to x1) from Party2 using oblivious transfers (OT) (or one invo-
cation of the OT extension schemes [75–77]). Note that this does not increase the
round complexity of our overall protocol, since the exchange messages needed for
OT rounds can be accompanied to the protocol rounds (i.e., the first round of OT
is sent with P message and the second one with Q and the third one with F,X2).
Using F , the garbled input X = (X1, X2), T , and pif , Party1 evaluates the
whole garbled circuit in topological order. If an outgoing wire owd is mapped to an
incoming wire iwe, then the group element Ve of the e-th incoming wire is computed
by the multiplication of the group element Wd of the d-th outgoing wire and the
blinding value te (i.e., if pif (d) = e, then Ve = te · Wd). Each garbled gate GGa
can be evaluated when both group elements (Vi, Vj) on its incoming wires (iwi,
iwj) are computed. To evaluate each GGa, Party1 first computes H(Vi, Vj, gateID),
and then XORs the ciphertext in the GGa pointed by I
1
a -th and I
2
a -th bits of the
H(Vi, Vj, gateID)τ . In the end, Party1 obtains the token set Y = (y1, . . . , ym) for the
output bits of the function y = f(x1, x2).
5.2.2 Optimization with reusability feature: Our (ReExe)
protocol
One of the novelties of our scheme over the state-of-the-art is that our scheme
results in a significant cost reduction when the same private function is evaluated
more than once between the same or varying evaluating parties. This feature is
quite beneficial in relevant real-life scenarios where individuals (or enterprises) can
mutually and continuously have a long-term business relationship instead of a single
deal. Note that such a cost reduction is not available in the protocols of KM11 [9]
and MS13 [17] since they require all token generation and 2PC procedures repeated
in all executions. However, our scheme involves ReuseTempf that is reusable for the
generation of tokens on incoming and outgoing wires. The reusability of ReuseTempf
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incurs a massive reduction in protocol overhead since a large part of costs in existing
2PFE protocols [9, 17] results from the generation of these tokens.
Party1 Party2
input: x1,k ∈ {0, 1}∗, Cf , pif , T Pre-shared info: input: x2,k ∈ {0, 1}∗
G, q, P,PubInfoCf ,ReuseTempf
Offline
Pre-computation
Pick: α0,k, α1,k ∈R Z∗q.
Generate: W0k := (W 0i,k  α0,k · Pi),
W1k := (W 1i,k  α1,k · Pi), i = 1, . . . ,M .
V0k := (V 0j,k  α0,k ·Qj),
V1k := (V 1j,k  α1,k ·Qj), j = 1, . . . , N.
Pick: Y 0k := (y
0
i,k R {0, 1}`),
Y 1k := (y
1
i,k R {0, 1}`), i = 1, . . . ,m.
Generate garbled circ. Fk by using
(W0k ,W1k ,V0k ,V1k , Y 0k , Y 1k ,PubInfoCf ).
Run 2PC Protocol
Act as Evaluator Act as Garbler
Fk, X2,k←−−−−−−−−−−−
Using Fk, X1,k, X2,k, T, pif OT (if needed)←−−−−−−−−−−→
obtain Y = f (x1,k, x2,k).
Figure 5.3: Sketch of our ReExe protocol for the k-th execution (k > 1). The number of
rounds is equal to 1, or 2, or 3 depending on the input size of Party1.
Our ReExe protocol optimizes the baseline InExe scheme presented by utilizing
the Reusable Mapping Template ReuseTempf when the same private function is
evaluated more than once.
Figure 5.3 depicts the sketch of our optimized ReExe protocol and Figure 5.4
give the detailed protocol steps. In ReExe protocol most of the calculations are
performed in the oﬄine pre-computation phase. For the k-th evaluation, Party2
picks α0,k, α1,k ∈R Z∗q values then prepares the sets W0k , W1k , V0k , V1k , Y 0k and Y 1k .
Then usingW0k ,W1k ,V0k ,V1k , Y 0k , Y 1k and PubInfoCf , Party2 prepares the garbled circuit
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F as in the InExe protocol. The online phase then includes only the 2PC stage that
also runs the same way as in Section 5.2.1. During the evaluation procedure of the
2PC stage, Party1 always use the same T in all protocol runs.
The number of rounds is equal to 1, or 2, or 3 depending on the input string
length of Party1. Namely, if x1 = ⊥, then the number of rounds is equal to 1 (i.e.,
no rounds needed for OT). If Party1’s input bits are not many, it is more efficient to
use separate OTs for Party1’s input tokens in parallel instead of an OT extension
scheme. There exists OT schemes with 2 rounds (e.g., [147] and [148]). Hence,
this choice results in a PFE scheme with overall 2 rounds (i.e., one round is sent
accompanied by Fk, X2,k message and the other OT round is sent from Party1 to
Party2). If Party1’s input bits are many, then using an OT extension scheme is more
efficient. Note that Ishai based OT extension schemes are composed of O(λ) parallel
OTs (again can be realized by Naor and Pinkas’s OT [148]) and an additional round.
Similarly, this choice results in a PFE scheme with overall 3 rounds.
5.2.3 Executing with Various Party2s
In the previous section, we have addressed the case where the same two parties
would like to evaluate the same function multiple times. In this section, we deal
with the case that Party1 would like to run the 2PFE protocol for the same private
function with various Party2s separately. This is a relevant scenario where Party1
may run a business with many customers for her algorithm/software. Suppose that
a cryptological research institution invents a practical algorithm for breaking RSA.
Since such an algorithm would clearly attract a substantial demand, the institution
may prefer preserving the details of the algorithm selling only its use. On the other
hand, in many cases, the clients would not like to share the keys (i.e., private inputs)
with the institution. This is one of the several scenarios that a 2PFE protocol for
the same private function with various Party2s is suitable for.
First of all, we recall that the execution of our second protocol in Figure 5.3
requires the preknowledge of ReuseTempf := (P ,Q) by Party2 and the set T by
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Our ReExe Protocol: The procedures for the k-th execution (k > 1)
Party1’s Input: x1,k ∈ {0, 1}∗, a Boolean circuit Cf consisting of NAND gates (compiled from
the function f), a mapping pif (extracted from Cf ), and the blinding set T := (t1, . . . , tN :
tj ∈R Z∗q , j = 1, . . . , N).
Party2’s Input: x2,k ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Pre-shared Information: A cyclic group G of prime order q with a generator P , PubInfoCf ,
and ReuseTempf
a.
Output: f(x1,k, x2,k).
Precomputation phase of the k-th execution:
1. Party2 picks α0,k, α1,k ∈R Z∗q and prepares the group element setsW0k := (W 01,k, . . . ,W 0M,k :
W 0i,k  α0,k ·Pi, i = 1, . . . ,M) for FALSEs andW1k := (W 11,k, . . . ,W 1M,k : W 1i,k  α1,k ·Pi, i =
1, . . . ,M) for TRUEs for owi ∈ OW, and V0k := (V 01,k, . . . , V 0N,k : V 0j,k  α0,k · Qj , j =
1, . . . , N) for FALSEs and V1k := (V 11,k, . . . , V 1N,k : V 1j,k  α1,k · Qj , j = 1, . . . , N) for TRUEs
for iwj ∈ IW. Next, Party2 generates two random token sets for output wires of the circuit
Y 0k := (y
0
1,k, . . . , y
0
o,k : y
0
i,k R {0, 1}`, i = 1, . . . ,m) and Y 1k := (y11,k, . . . , y1o,k : y1i,k R
{0, 1}`, i = 1, . . . ,m).
2. The 2PC protocol now starts from this stage where Party2 becomes the garbler and Party1
becomes the evaluator. Using W0k , W1k , V0k , V1k , Y 0k , Y 1k , and PubInfoCf , Party2 prepares the
garbled circuit Fk by garbling each gate as follows. Party2 prepares the following four cipher-
texts to garble a non-output NAND gate Ga whose incoming wires are iwi and iwj , and out-
going wire is owz: EncV 0i,k,V 0j,k(W
1
z,k), EncV 0i,k,V 1j,k(W
1
z,k), EncV 1i,k,V 0j,k(W
1
z,k), EncV 1i ,V 1j (W
0
z,k).
Similarly, Party2 also prepares the following four ciphertexts to garble an output
NAND gate Gb whose incoming wires are iwi and iwj , and output wire index is z:
EncV 0i,k,V 0j,k(y
1
z,k), EncV 0i,k,V 1j,k(y
1
z,k), EncV 1i,k,V 0j,k(y
1
z,k), EncV 1i ,V 1j (y
0
z,k). Each garbled gate
GGa,k is then composed of four `-bit ciphertexts and two log2(τ)-bit bit indices, I
1
a,k and
I2a,k (see Section 5.2.1 for garbling details). Party2 stores Fk, W0k , W1k , Y 0k , and Y 1k .
Online phase of the k-th execution
Round 1:
3. Party2 sends Fk and the garbled input X2,k for its own input x2,k to Party1.
4. Party1 gets the garbled input X1,k for its own input x1,k from Party2 using parallel 1-out-of-2
OTs (or a more efficient OT extension scheme).
5. Using Fk, the garbled input Xk = (X1,k, X2,k), T , and pif , Party1 evaluates the whole
garbled circuit in topological order. If an outgoing wire owd is mapped to an incoming wire
iwe, then the group element Ve of the e-th incoming wire is computed by the multiplication of
the group element Wd of the d-th outgoing wire and the blinding value te (i.e., if pif (d) = e,
then Ve,k = te · Wd,k). Each garbled gate GGa,k can be evaluated whenever both group
elements (Vi,k, Vj,k) on its incoming wires (iwi, iwj) are computed. To evaluate each GGa,k,
Party1 first computes H(Vi,k, Vj,k, gateID), and then XORs the ciphertext in the GGa,k pointed
by I1a,k-th and I
2
a,k-th bits of [H(Vi,k, Vj,k, gateID)]τ . At the end, Party1 obtains the token set
Yk = (y1,k, . . . , yo,k) for the output bits f(x1,k, x2,k).
aReuseTempf is already computed in InExe as in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.4: Our Optimized ReExe 2PFE Protocol that utilizes Reusable Mapping Template
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Party1. Trivially, once ReuseTempf and T are produced during InExe with any Party2
as in our first protocol in Figure 5.1, then they can be stored, and our second protocol
can be made use of in the subsequent executions with the same Party2. We are here
interested in a more efficient mechanism running with various Party2s by eliminating
the costs of our first protocol for generating the preknowledge. The goal of this
mechanism is to generate the generator set P in such a way that Party1 does not
know the relation between any two of its elements. T and Q can be subsequently
computed, once the generator set P is given to Party1. In order to do so, we utilize
a distributed system2 based on a t-out-of-n threshold mechanism (fault tolerant
against arbitrary behaviour of up to t malicious and colluding authorities) which
takes (G, q, P,M) as input and outputs P .
In the oﬄine stage of our new mechanism, the generator set P is generated by the
distributed authorities, and given to Party1. Next, Party1 computes the sets T and
ReuseTempf . It then publishes PubInfoCf and ReuseTempf so that any prospective k-
th party Party2,k can utilize them in a 2PFE protocol run. This oﬄine stage is dealt
with only once, and its outputs (i.e., T and ReuseTempf ) are used in the subsequent
executions. Note that the flow of re-executions for all Party2,ks is exactly the same
as our ReExe protocol. We would like to stress that the costs of any execution in our
new mechanism with a distributed system do not differ from the ReExe protocol.
5.3 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we first present the costs of our InExe and ReExe protocols in terms
of communication, online computation, and round complexities. We then compare
these protocols with the existing Boolean circuit based 2PFE schemes. M , N , λ,
and ρ denote the number of outgoing wires (i.e., equal to n + g −m), the number
of incoming wires (i.e., N = 2g), the security parameter, and the computation cost
2One can also suggest a single semi-trusted authority for generation of the generator set P.
However, the knowledge of the relations among the elements of P by a single party may violate
the privacy of inputs, and therefore, it is better to distribute the trust among multiple authorities.
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ratio, respectively. For KM11 and MS13-HE, it is assumed that the elliptic curve
ElGamal is used for the singly homomorphic encryption schemes (as suggested in
their paper). Also, for KM11 and our protocols, we assume that each element of G
has a length ` = 2λ bits for λ-bit security. We ignore the small communication cost
of bit indices in garbled gates (2 × log2(τ) bits for each garbled gate) used for the
point and permute optimization.
Table 5.1: Comparison of the existing 2PFE schemes in terms of overall communication
(in bits) and online computation costs (in terms of symmetric-key operations), oﬄine
computation costs (in terms of symmetric-key operations), and the number of rounds. M ,
N , λ, and ρ denote the number of outgoing wires (i.e., equal to n + g −m), the number
of incoming wires (i.e., N = 2g), the security parameter, and the computation cost ratio,
respectively.
Communication Online Comp. Oﬄine Comp. Rounds
KM11-1st [9, Sec.3.1] (4M + 10N)λ (ρ+ 2.5)N 4(M +N)ρ 3
KM11-2nd [9, Sec.3.2] (2M + 7N)λ (ρ+ 2.5)N 2(M +N)ρ 3
MS13-OSN [17] (10N log2N + 4N + 5)λ 6N log2N + 2.5N + 3 O(λ) 6
MS13-HE [17] (2M + 6N)λ (ρ+ 2.5)N 2(M +N)ρ 3
GKS17 [19] (2N log2N)λ 0.7N log2N 2N log2N 3
BBKL18 [20] (6N log2N + 0.5N + 3)λ 6N log2N +N + 3 O(λ) 6
Our InExe Protocol (2M + 6N)λ (4ρ+ 2.5)N (3M − 1)ρ 3
Our ReExe Protocol 4Nλ (ρ+ 0.5)N 2(M +N)ρ+ 2 1 / 2 / 3
5.3.1 Complexity of Our Scheme
Communication cost: Considering our InExe protocol, the overall communica-
tion overhead is (2M + 6N)λ bits, composed of (i) the set P (M of 2λ-bit strings)
is sent by Party2 in Round 1, (ii) the set Q (N of 2λ-bit strings) is sent by Party1 in
Round 2, (iii) the garbled circuit (2N of 2λ-bit strings) is sent by Party2 in Round
3, where M is the number of outgoing wires and N is the number of incoming wires
(N = 2g). Considering our ReExe protocol, the use of ReuseTempf eliminates the
transmission of (2M+2N)λ bits (required for token generation). Therefore, in total
only 4Nλ bits (required for the garbled circuit) are transmitted.
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Computation cost: In terms of online computation complexity, InExe protocol
requires 4N elliptic curve point multiplications, composed of (i) N operations by
Party1 in Round 2, (ii) 2N operations by Party2 in Round 3, (iii) N operations by
Party1 during the evaluation of the garbled circuit. There is also a relatively small
cost of 2.5N symmetric-key operations during the 2PC stage (composed of 2N op-
erations by Party2 for garbling and 0.5N operations by Party1 for evaluating). ReExe
protocol reduces the online computation costs to N elliptic curve point multiplica-
tions and 0.5N symmetric-key operations (carried out only by Party1). Note that
Beaver’s OT pre-computation technique [147] can be used for decomposing OT’s
for Party1’s input bits into online/oﬄine stages. This eliminates online public-key
operations of OT by carrying out them oﬄine.
Number of rounds: Our InExe protocol has 3 rounds. The number of rounds of
our ReExe protocol is equal to 1, or 2, or 3 depending on the input string length of
Party1. Namely, if Party1 has x1 = ⊥, then the number of rounds is equal to 1 (i.e.,
no rounds needed for OT). If Party1’s input bits are not many, it is more efficient to
use separate OTs for Party1’s input tokens in parallel instead of an OT extension
scheme. There exist OT schemes with 2 rounds (e.g., [147] and [148]). Hence, this
choice results in a PFE scheme with overall 2 rounds. If Party1’s input bits are
many, then using an OT extension scheme is more efficient. Note that Ishai based
OT extension schemes are composed of O(λ) parallel OTs (again can be realized by
Naor and Pinkas’s OT [148]) and an additional round. Similarly, this choice results
in a PFE scheme with overall 3 rounds.
5.3.2 Comparison
We now compare our 2PFE protocols with the state-of-the-art constant-round 2PFE
protocols. In our scheme, we utilize an EC cyclic group where the DDH assumption
holds for state-of-the-art efficiency. For [9], we take into account both protocols: (1)
their “C-PFE protocol” (see [9, Sect. 3.1], what we call KM11-1st) and (2) their
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Table 5.2: Comparison of the existing 2PFE schemes in terms of overall communication
costs for various circuit sizes. Here we take N = 2M and λ = 128.
Number of Gates
210 215 220 225 230
KM11-1st [9, Sec.3.1] 0.38 MB 12.00 MB 0.38 GB 12.00 GB 384.00 GB
KM11-2nd [9, Sec.3.2] 0.25 MB 8.00 MB 0.25 GB 8.00 GB 256.00 GB
MS13-OSN [17] 3.56 MB 164.00 MB 6.69 GB 264.00 GB 10, 048.00 GB
MS13-HE [17] 0.22 MB 7.00 MB 0.22 GB 7.00 GB 224.00 GB
GKS17 [19] 0.68 MB 32.00 MB 1.31 GB 52.00 GB 1, 984.00 GB
BBKL18 [20] 1.89 MB 90.50 MB 3.77 GB 151.00 GB 5, 776.00 GB
Our InExe Protocol 0.22 MB 7.00 MB 0.22 GB 7.00 GB 224.00 GB
Our ReExe Protocol 0.13 MB 4.00 MB 0.13 GB 4.00 GB 128.00 GB
“A More Efficient Variant” (see [9, Sect. 3.2], what we call KM11-2nd). For a
fair comparison, we assume that the point and permute optimization [29] is directly
applied to the MS13 and KM11 protocols during the 2PC phase3. Regarding the HE
based schemes, for a fair comparison, we assume that EC-ElGamal is used. Also,
considering KM11 and our protocols, we assume that each element of G has a length
` = 2λ bits for a λ-bit security.
Table 5.1 compares the existing 2PFE schemes in terms of overall communication
cost, online/oﬄine computation costs, and the number of rounds. We also provide
Table 5.2 that depicts a comparison in terms of overall communication costs for
various circuit sizes. In general, MS13-OSN, GKS17, BBKL18 performs O(NlogN),
whereas MS13-HE, KM11 and our protocols achieve linear complexity4. Note that
although the complexity of MS13-HE is same as our InExe protocol, for the later
executions our ReExe protocol enjoys a significant cost reduction due to the reusabil-
ity feature, which is not possible for MS13-HE and KM11 protocols. For all circuit
sizes, the communication costs of ReExe protocol are significantly lower than that
3In [17] and [9], for the 2PC phases, the authors do not suggest any optimization. However, a
point and permute optimization is available for both schemes.
4Note that M ≤ N , therefore O(M +N) = O(N)
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of existing 2PFE protocols.
The advantage of our scheme becomes more pronounced when the number of
executions is more than one. To demonstrate this, we define the normalized cost
efficiency (NCE) function that takes a protocol (Proti), a circuit Cf and the number
of executions (k), then outputs an efficiency ratio wrt our scheme. The normalized
cost efficiency is calculated via dividing the cumulative communication cost of our
protocol by that of Proti. i.e.,
NCE(Proti, Cf , k) =
fc(InExe, Cf ) + (k − 1)fc(ReExe, Cf )
kfc(Proti, Cf )
,
where fc is the cost function that outputs the communication cost value for a given
protocol and Cf .
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 depict the normalized cost efficiency comparison of
the protocols for circuits with 210 and 230 gates, respectively. Also, without loss of
generality, we take N = 2M . Considering MS13-HE, although it performs the same
efficiency in the initial execution, after the second execution, its efficiency is about
0.8 (meaning that our protocol saves about 20% bandwidth as compared to MS13-
HE), and after ten executions it is about 0.63 (we achieve 37% saving). Moreover,
for two executions our cost reduction is about 54% over KM11-1st, 30% over KM11-
2nd. For ten executions our cost reduction is about 63% over KM11-1st, 44% over
KM11-2nd.
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 shows how the normalized cost efficiency changes with
respect to circuit size. For the protocols that have linear complexity, the normalized
cost efficiency does not change as the number of gates increases. However, for
the protocols with O(N log N) complexity, their normalized efficiency dramatically
decreases. For instance, after two executions, our cost reduction is about 74% and
91% over GKS17; about 91% and 97% over BBKL18; and about 95% and 98% over
MS13-OSN for a thousand and a billion gate circuits, respectively. Table 5.3 depicts
our efficiency gain (in percentage) over existing 2PFE schemes in terms of overall
communication costs with respect to the number of protocol runs, in detail.
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of cumulative communication cost via normalized bandwidth
efficiency vs. number of PFE executions using a circuit 210 gates.
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of cumulative communication cost via normalized bandwidth
efficiency vs. number of PFE executions using a circuit 230 gates.
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Table 5.3: Our efficiency gain (in percentage) over existing 2PFE schemes in terms of overall communication costs with respect to the
number of protocol runs.
Existing No. of
Our Efficiency Gain (%)
Protocols Gates 1st run 2nd run 3rd run 4th run 5th run 6th run 7th run 8th run 9th run 10th run
MS13-HE [17]
Any
0 20.45 27.27 30.68 32.73 34.09 35.06 35.80 36.36 36.82
KM11-2nd [9] 12.00 30.00 36.00 39.00 40.80 42.00 42.86 43.50 44.00 44.40
KM11-1st [9] 42.11 53.95 57.89 59.87 61.05 61.84 62.41 62.83 63.16 63.42
GKS17 [19]
210
67.65 74.26 76.47 77.57 78.24 78.68 78.99 79.23 79.41 79.56
BBKL18 [20] 88.36 90.74 91.53 91.93 92.17 92.33 92.44 92.53 92.59 92.65
MS13-OSN [17] 93.82 95.08 95.51 95.72 95.84 95.93 95.99 96.03 96.07 96.10
GKS17 [19]
230
88.71 91.13 91.94 92.34 92.58 92.74 92.86 92.94 93.01 93.06
BBKL18 [20] 96.12 96.95 97.23 97.37 97.45 97.51 97.55 97.58 97.60 97.62
MS13-OSN [17] 97.77 98.25 98.41 98.49 98.54 98.57 98.59 98.61 98.62 98.63
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For the computation costs, in order to compare symmetric-key and asymmetric-
key based operations, we define the computation cost ratio ρ as the cost of an
elliptic curve point multiplication divided by the cost of a symmetric-key operation
for the same security level. Note that the value of ρ depends upon several factors,
such as the software implementations, the symmetric-key encryption scheme, the
availability of short-cut algorithms, the type of chosen elliptic curve, the hardware
infrastructure, and the type of utilized processors. For example, according to [149],
in a setting where curve25519, and SHA256 are picked as the EC and the hash
function, respectively, and the operations take place on an Intel Xeon Processor
E3-1220 v6 (amd64, 4x3GHz), the value of ρ is roughly 130.
Among all protocols, our ReExe protocol performs the best result in terms of
round complexity. Namely, the number of rounds in ReExe is equal to 1 if Party1 has
x1 = ⊥, or 2 if Party1 has a non-empty input x1 in such that the OT extension is
not applicable to its garbled input, or 3 otherwise. Note that the arithmetic circuit
based protocol of [17] provides O(g) round complexity (see [17, p. 570])).
5.4 Security of Our Protocols
In this section, we give simulation-based security proofs of our InExe protocol in
Figure 5.1, ReExe protocol in Figure 5.3, and our mechanism with various Party2s
in Sect. 5.2.3 in accordance with the security proof of [9].
Theorem 5.4.1. If the following three conditions hold then the 2PFE protocol pro-
posed in Figure 5.1 is secure against semi-honest adversaries: (1) the DDH assump-
tion is hard in the cyclic group G, (2) the hash-function H : G × G × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}`+τ involved in the instantiation of DKC scheme is modeled as a random ora-
cle, (3) the OT scheme securely realizes FOT functionality in the OT-hybrid model
against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. First, consider the case that Party1 is corrupted. For any probabilistic polyno-
mial time adversary A1, controlling Party1 in the real world, we construct a simulator
78
S1 that simulates A1’s view in the ideal world. S1 runs A1 on Party1’s inputs, f and
x1, the function output token set Y = (y1, . . . , ym), the pre-shared group parameters,
and PubInfoCf as follows.
1. S1 generates the generator set P˜ := (P˜1, . . . , P˜M). S1 also prepares the group
element sets W˜0 := (W˜ 01 , . . . , W˜ 0M : W˜ 0i  α˜0,i · P, α˜0,i ∈R Z∗q, i = 1, . . . ,M)
and W˜1 := (W˜ 11 , . . . , W˜ 1M : W˜ 1i  α˜1,i · P, α˜1,i ∈R Z∗q, i = 1, . . . ,M). S1 gives
P˜ to A1.
2. S1 receives the blinding set T := (t1, . . . , tN : tj ∈R Z∗q, j = 1, . . . , N) from
A1, and prepares the sets V˜0 := (V˜ 01 , . . . , V˜ 0N : V˜ 0j  tj · W˜ 0pi−1f (j), j = 1, . . . , N)
and V˜1 := (V˜ 11 , . . . , V˜ 1N : V˜ 1j  tj · W˜ 1pi−1f (j), j = 1, . . . , N).
3. S1 prepares the garbled circuit F˜ by garbling each gate as follows. S1 garbles
each non-output NAND gate by encrypting only the group element for FALSE
on its outgoing wire with all four possible input token combinations (i.e., for
a gate whose incoming wires are iwi and iwj, outgoing wire is owz, S1 prepares
the following four ciphertexts: c˜t
1
a = EncV˜ 0i ,V˜ 0j (W˜
0
z ), c˜t
2
a = EncV˜ 0i ,V˜ 1j (W˜
0
z ),
c˜t
3
a = EncV˜ 1i ,V˜ 0j (W˜
0
z ), c˜t
4
a = EncV˜ 1i ,V˜ 1j (W˜
0
z ). To garble an output NAND gate
whose incoming wires are iwi and iwj, and output wire is z, S1 prepares the four
ciphertexts: c˜t
1
b = EncV˜ 0i ,V 0j (yz), c˜t
2
b = EncV˜ 0i ,V˜ 1j (yz), c˜t
3
b = EncV˜ 1i ,V˜ 0j (yz), c˜t
4
b =
EncV˜ 1i ,V˜ 1j (yz). For each garbled gate G˜Ga, S1 then permutes c˜t
2
a, c˜t
3
a, c˜t
4
a, and
picks I˜1a , I˜
2
a ∈R {1, . . . , τ}, and places c˜t1a in the order pointed by I˜1a -th and
I˜2a -th bits of [H(V˜
0
i , V˜
0
j , gateID)]τ among the other three ciphertexts. Each
garbled gate G˜Ga is then composed of four `-bit ciphertexts and two log2(τ)-
bit random values I˜1a and I˜
2
a .
4. S1 gives F˜ to A1 along with the simulated garbled input consisting of only the
group elements for FALSEs on both parties’ input wires X˜ = (X˜1, X˜2). This
completes our simulation.
In what follows, we prove that the information obtained by Party1 in the real
execution (P ,W , F ) is identically distributed to (P˜ , W˜ , F˜ ), where for outgoing wires,
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Party1 obtains the group elementsW = (W1, . . . ,WM) while A1 obtaining the group
elements W˜ = (W˜ 01 , . . . , W˜ 0M). We now show the computational indistinguishability
of (P ,W) and (P˜ , W˜) by utilizing Lemma 5.1.1, which ultimately ties the security
of our protocol to the DDH assumption. More concretely, we need to show
{(P1, . . . , PM ,W1, . . . ,WM)} ≈c {(P˜1, . . . , P˜M , W˜ 01 , . . . , W˜ 0M)}
and
{(r1 · P, . . . , rM · P, αb1 · (r1 · P ), . . . , αbM · (rM · P ))} ≈c
{(r˜1 · P, . . . , r˜M · P, α˜0,1 · P, . . . , α˜0,M · P )}
where bi ∈ {0, 1} is the semantic value on owi and P˜i = r˜i · P . For the sake
of a simpler representation, we replace αbiri with rM+i, and α˜0,i with r˜M+i for
i = 1, . . . ,M . Note that (r1, . . . , r2M) is not identically distributed to (r˜1, . . . , r˜2M),
while it is only sufficient to show that
{(r1 · P, . . . , r2M · P )} ≈c {(r˜1 · P, . . . , r˜2M · P )}.
For this purpose, we generate a new set R := (R1, . . . , R2M) by picking 2M random
generators. Hence, we now need to show
{(R1, . . . , R2M , r1 · P, . . . , r2M · P )} ≈c {(R1, . . . , R2M , r˜1 · P, . . . , r˜2M · P )}
Thanks to Lemma 5.1.1 and the underlying DDH assumption, we have both
{(R1, . . . , R2M , γ ·R1, . . . , γ ·R2M)} ≈c {(R1, . . . , R2M , r1 · P, . . . , r2M · P )}
and
{(R1, . . . , R2M , γ ·R1, . . . , γ ·R2M)} ≈c {(R1, . . . , R2M , r˜1 · P, . . . , r˜2M · P )}
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where γ ∈R Z∗q. Hence, the following sets are computationally indistinguishable
{(r1 · P, . . . , r2M · P )} ≈c {(r˜1 · P, . . . , r˜2M · P )}
which effectively concludes the proof for {(P ,W)} ≈c {(P˜ , W˜)}. Furthermore,
since the same values in T are used among the outgoing wire tokens and incoming
wire tokens in both the real and the ideal executions, we have {(P ,W ,V)} ≈c
{(P˜ , W˜ , V˜)} where for each incoming wire V = (V1, . . . , VN) is the set of tokens
obtained by Party1 and V˜ = (V˜ 01 , . . . , V˜ 0N) is the set of tokens obtained by A1. In
contrast to [9], it is relatively simple to prove the computational indistinguishability
of F and F˜ in our scheme since we use a hash function modeled as a random oracle
during garbling. Once the distribution of four hash outputs for each gate (in the real
and ideal executions) are proven to be computationally indistinguishable random
values, outputs of our instantiation of DKC is also proven to be computationally
indistinguishable. This results in the computational indistinguishability of each
garbled gate GGa and G˜Ga, and eventually computational indistinguishability of F
and F˜ . For a gate whose incoming wires are iwi and iwj, in the real execution, we
have four hash outputs involved in the garbling as follows:
H(V 0i , V
0
j , gateID), H(V
0
i , V
1
j , gateID),
H(V 1i , V
0
j , gateID), H(V
1
i , V
1
j , gateID).
Similarly, for each gate, in the ideal execution, we have the following four hash
outputs in the garbling as follows:
H(V˜ 0i , V˜
0
j , gateID), H(V˜
0
i , V˜
1
j , gateID),
H(V˜ 1i , V˜
0
j , gateID), H(V˜
1
i , V˜
1
j , gateID).
Since in Party1’s view, resulting from the indistinguishability of V and V˜ , the hash
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inputs are computationally indistinguishable, and therefore, the hash outputs are
computationally indistinguishable random values. This completes the proof for
{(P ,W , F )} ≈c {(P˜ , W˜ , F˜ )}.
We now consider the case that Party2 is corrupted. For any probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A2, controlling Party2 during our first protocol in the real world, we
construct a simulator S2 that simulates A2’s view in the ideal world. S2 runs A2 on
Party2’s input, and the pre-shared group parameters, and PubInfoCf as follows.
1. S2 asks A2 to generate P˜  Init(G, q, P,M) and receives P˜ .
2. S2 then picks t˜j ∈R Z∗q for j = 1, . . . , N , and computes Q˜j  t˜j · P which are
now random group elements in G. S2 assigns Q˜ = (Q˜1, . . . , Q˜N), and gives Q˜
to A2. This completes our simulation.
In the real execution of our protocol, Party2 receives only the message Q :=
(Q1, . . . , QN : Qj  tj ·Ppi−1f (j), j = 1, . . . , N) in Round 2 (apart from the exchanged
messages during the OT protocol for Party1’s garbled input). However, the tran-
scripts received by Party2 during the OT do not leak any information to Party2
because of the ideal execution of FOT in the OT-hybrid model. Due to the DDH as-
sumption, in Party2’s view, the distributions of Q˜ and Q are identical (i.e., Q˜ ≈c Q).
This concludes the proof for the InExe protocol.
Theorem 5.4.2. If the 2PFE protocol proposed in Figure 5.1 is secure against semi-
honest adversaries (i.e., the three conditions in Theorem 5.4.1 are satisfied), then the
2PFE protocol proposed in Figure 5.3 is also secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Sketch. The main difference of the ReExe protocol from the first one is the utiliza-
tion of ReuseTempf . Therefore, the proof will be complete once we show that the
utilization of the sets W0k , W1k , V0k , and W1k computed from the same ReuseTempf
in the k-th execution gives Party1 no advantage in deducing Party2’s inputs.
We now show that in Party1’s view, (Wk,Vk,Wk+1,Vk+1) in two consecutive real
executions are computationally indistinguishable from (W˜1, V˜1, W˜2, V˜2) where W˜1 :=
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(W˜1,1, . . . , W˜M,1 : W˜i,1 = q˜i,1 · P, q˜i,1 ∈R Z∗q, i = 1, . . . ,M), V˜1 := (V˜1,1, . . . , V˜N,1 :
V˜j,1  tj · W˜pi−1f (j),1, j = 1, . . . , N), W˜2 := (W˜1,2, . . . , W˜M,2 : W˜i,2 = q˜i,2 · P, q˜i,2 ∈R
Z∗q, i = 1, . . . ,M), and V˜2 := (V˜1,2, . . . , V˜N,2 : V˜j,2  tj · W˜pi−1f (j),2, j = 1, . . . , N).
More concretely, we have
{((1, k), . . . , (M,k), t1 · (pi−1f (1), k), . . . , tN · (pi−1f (N), k),
(1, k + 1), . . . , (M,k + 1), t1 · (pi−1f (1), k + 1), . . . , tN · (pi−1f (N), k + 1))}
≈c {(q˜1,1 · P, . . . , q˜M,1 · P, t1 · (q˜pi−1f (1),1 · P ),
. . . , tN · (q˜pi−1f (N),1 · P ), q˜1,2 · P, . . . , q˜M,2 · P,
t1 · (q˜pi−1f (1),2 · P ), . . . , tN · (q˜pi−1f (N),2 · P ))}
where (i, j) is the abbreviation for αbi,j ,j · Pi, and bi,k ∈ {0, 1} is the semantic bit
value of owi in the k-th execution. The proof of their indistinguishability relies on
the same flow as the proof of Theorem 5.4.1, which depends on Lemma 5.1.1 and
ultimately on the DDH assumption.
Theorem 5.4.3. If the threshold system is secure against malicious adversaries at
most t−1 of whom are allowed to collude, and the 2PFE protocol proposed in Figure
5.3 is secure against semi-honest adversaries; then our mechanism with various
Party2s in Sect. 5.2.3 is also secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Sketch. First, Party1’s view in the 2PFE mechanism is equivalent to the one in the
protocol in Figure 5.3. Observe that the generator set is generated by the distributed
system and the tokens (that are used in the preparation of the garbled input Xk
and the garbled circuit Fk) are computed from α0,k or α1,k in each evaluation as
in Figure 5.3. Therefore, the 2PFE mechanism prevents Party1 from deducing any
information about Party2,k’s input. Second, Party2,ks cannot obtain any information
about Party1’s input in none of the executions since the OT outputs are only obtained
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by Party1 due the FOT functionality in the OT-hybrid model. Also, due to Theorem
5.4.1, no one can obtain information about pif from the ReuseTempf . Moreover, any
Party2,k has a negligible advantage on distinguishing the exchanged messages in an
evaluation between Party1 and Party2,l from a random string due to the underlying
DDH assumption for l 6= k. More concretely, the tokens (that are used in the
preparation of Party2,l’s garbled input X2,l and the garbled circuit Fl) are computed
by multiplying the elements of the ReuseTempf with the private values α0,l or α1,l
of Party2,l.
84
Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we studied the problem of the private function evaluation. Pri-
vate function evaluation (PFE) is a special case of secure multi-party computation
(MPC), where the function to be computed is known by only one party. PFE is
useful in several real-life applications where an algorithm or a function itself needs
to remain secret for reasons such as protecting intellectual property or security clas-
sification level.
One of the primary objectives of the recent research on MPC, and specifically
PFE, is minimizing the communication cost. This is due to the fact that historical
developments in hardware technology show us computing power advances faster than
communication channels. This is even more likely to be so in the near future, i.e.,
the main bottleneck for many secure computation applications will not be the CPU
load but be the bandwidth constraints [28, 108]. Motivated by this, we are mainly
interested in reducing the communication complexity of the 2PFE protocols.
We first proposed an efficient and secure protocol for 2PFE based on (mostly)
symmetric cryptography primitives. In this respect, we proposed an efficient proto-
col by adapting the state-of-the-art half gates garbling optimization [1] to Mohassel
and Sadeghian’s 2PFE scheme [17] 2PFE scheme. Our optimization achieves a
remarkable advantage over [17] in both OSN and 2PC phases in terms of communi-
cation complexity. In particular, in the OSN phase, our protocol reduces the number
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of required OTs and data sizes entering the protocol. In 2PC phase, our half gate
based scheme garbles each non-output gate with three ciphertexts, and each output
gate with two ciphertexts. All in all, our protocol improves the state-of-the-art by
saving more than 40% of the overall communication cost.
Next, we have proposed a secure and highly efficient 2PFE scheme for Boolean
circuits based on the DDH assumption. Our scheme consists of two protocols: (1) a
protocol for initial executions (InExe), (2) a resumption protocol (ReExe) for subse-
quent executions. The latter protocol is more efficient due to the fact that it benefits
from the reusable tokens generated already in the former one. One of the novelties
of our scheme over the state-of-the-art is that our scheme results in a significant
cost reduction when the same private function is evaluated more than once between
the same or varying evaluating parties. This feature is quite beneficial in relevant
real-life scenarios where individuals (or enterprises) can mutually and continuously
have a long-term business relationship instead of a single deal. Note that such a
cost reduction is not available in the protocols of KM11 [9] and MS13 [17] since they
require all token generation and 2PC procedures repeated in all executions. How-
ever, our scheme involves ReuseTempf that is reusable for the generation of tokens
on incoming and outgoing wires. The reusability of ReuseTempf incurs a massive
reduction in protocol overhead since a large part of costs in existing 2PFE proto-
cols [9,17] results from the generation of these tokens. Our protocols achieve linear
communication and computation complexities and a constant number of rounds
which is at most three. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first and most
efficient 2PFE scheme that enjoys a reusability feature.
Comparing the existing protocols, our scheme asymptotically reduces the com-
munication cost compared to MS13-OSN [17], BBKL18 [20], and GKS17 [19] pro-
tocols (i.e., from O(g log(g)) to O(g) where g is the number of gates). For instance,
for a billion-gate circuit, our cost reduction is about 98% over MS13-OSN, about
96% over BBKL18, and about 89% over GKS17. Comparing with the protocols that
have linear complexity, for ten executions (regardless of the number of gates) our
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cost reduction is about 63% over KM11-1st, 44% over KM11-2nd, and 37% over
MS13-HE.
We also propose a solution for the case that Party1 runs the 2PFE protocol for
the same private function with various Party2s separately. This is a common scenario
where Party1 may run a business with many customers for her algorithm/software.
Instead of running InExe protocol with each Party2, we have proposed a more efficient
mechanism for the generation of the reusable tokens by utilizing a threshold based
system.
After all, we hope that our work sheds light on the future researches and leads to
more practical PFE constructions. In accordance with this goal, we conclude with
the following open questions:
1. Although the 2-OEP protocol in [17], which we utilize in our protocol, is quite
efficient for many circuit sizes, fails to be so in large-sized circuits due to its
O(g log(g)) complexity. This fact arises the following question: Can we have
a symmetric cryptography based 2-OEP protocol that has linear asymptotic
complexity while also being efficient in small circuit sizes?
2. Our and existing 2PFE protocols permit only one gate functionality (e.g.,
NAND or NOR) in a Boolean circuit. This yields another important future
challenge: Can we have a gate hiding mechanism in 2PFE schemes permitting
the use of various gates in logic circuit representations?
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